

Syria: Influencing the Narrative without Armed Intervention

IDLIB GOVERNORATE






Figure 1. Map of Syria with Idlib Governorate.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study delivers a comprehensive strategic, operational, and tactical analysis detailing how Idlib Governorate can be leveraged to:

- ◆ Influence the direction and outcome of the Syrian civil war by applying an **Unconventional Warfare (UW), “no boots on the ground” approach; and**
- ◆ Provide recommendations for a grass-roots, bottom up approach to generate legitimate, broad based transitional governance in accordance with US Government policy objectives

“The United States supports the Syrian people’s aspirations for a democratic, inclusive, and unified post-Assad Syria...The United States is providing...assistance to help those affected by the conflict...[to] help local opposition councils and civil society groups provide essential services to their communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of Syria.” - US Department of State, June 19 2013 (Appendix C)

US policy for Syria calls for empowering the opposition’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) and Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), providing critical aid to refugees, broadening lethal and non-lethal aid to the opposition, and directly supporting Civil Administrative Councils (CACs) and other governance mechanisms in liberated areas in Syria. However, US Government assistance to Syrians has been inhibited by fears of inadvertently aiding radical Islamists due to insufficient ground-level information.

Idlib Governorate offers the greatest potential for a strategic effect due to its multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian composition, emergent civil governance structures, proximity to the Turkish border, and the availability of humanitarian resources. Liberating Idlib Governorate’s main cities, Idlib City and Jisr al-Shugour, will:

- ◆ Cut the main ground lines of communication to Aleppo and provide the opposition freedom of movement across the entire northern stretch of the country;
- ◆ Offer the SOC a safe location inside Syria to serve legitimate local CACs and build credibility as a transitional governance structure; and
- ◆ Encourage minority defection from the Assad regime based upon the demonstration of multi-sectarian governance already in effect in Idlib Governorate through CACs.

The study’s operational and tactical assessments demonstrate in detail:

- ◆ **How to enhance the SOC’s legitimacy with the population by providing targeted, needed assistance through CACs, creating the foundation of a legitimate transitional governance system;**
- ◆ *Identify and leverage moderate armed Syrian opposition units to avoid inadvertently aiding Radical Islamist fighters;*
- ◆ Augment civil police forces to relieve armed Syrian opposition units of the burden of providing local security and governance support so they can turn to fighting the Assad Regime; and
- ◆ Reset the narrative of violence to a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic civil uprising united for political reform, economic opportunity, and human rights.

Accurate as of July 2013, the study is designed to be a dynamic, continually evolving document that can be updated in near real time as conditions on the ground change. While intended to accomplish the political UW objectives above, it can also be used to:

- ◆ Capture, shape, and geo-spatially depict predominant narratives among Syria's diverse communities to assess trends and adapt activities in near real time to achieve long-term US Government policy objectives;
- ◆ Identify moderate armed Syrian opposition units to which arms and equipment can be directed;
- ◆ Mitigate the impact and influence of Radical Islamic extremists, warlords, and militias in a post-Assad transition;
- ◆ Recreate the broad based, national civil society movement for political reform and human rights; and

Future iterations of this study, other governorate studies, and a national study comprised of aggregated governorate studies can:

- ◆ Assist the SMC in adapting to become an organized, transitional military force in a post-Assad environment;
- ◆ Establish civil police forces by providing uniforms, training, and communications equipment;
- ◆ Assist the repatriation of IDPs and refugees from Turkey and Jordan;
- ◆ Develop and monitor education initiatives to prevent Islamic extremist influence and messaging from radicalizing Syria's youth; and
- ◆ Measure the effectiveness of programs and initiatives.






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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

- ◊ The central UW objective is to recreate the multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic coalition that demanded reform and human rights in 2011.
- ◊ Nascent multi-sectarian governance and armed opposition units in Idlib directly counter the Assad narrative of Sunni “terrorist” domination.
- ◊ Minority defection from the Assad regime requires a viable transitional system for which the SOC and SMC provide a framework.
- ◊ Linking the SOC to the population through the CACs and moderate armed opposition can form the basis of transitional governance.

The Syrian civil war began on March 15, 2011 when a group of teenage boys were taken into custody by government security services, tortured with one castrated and killed. This single event was the catalyst that ignited the Syrian population against the repressive Assad regime. A national multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic civil uprising united for political reform, economic opportunity, and human rights swept the country. For the first seven months, the civil uprising was non-violent consisting of demonstrations against Assad. However, the movement met harsh repression and turned into armed rebellion in cities like Homs, Aleppo, Dera'a, and Idlib.

Through two years of conflict, internal and external forces have attempted to change the narrative of the fighting from its original reform message to one of a sectarian conflict. As a result, the social fabric of the Syrian population is being torn apart. This is

evidenced by Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah's open participation in the conflict, atrocities being committed by the Alawite Shabiha militia, the influence of Jihadi Salafist Jabhat al-Nusrah, and speculation of a re-creation of the 1930s-era Alawite State.

A once unified social movement and predominantly tolerant society is becoming fragmented along religious, ethnic, and tribal lines. Despite perceptions of the situation devolving into an Alawite-Sunni sectarian conflict over power, most Syrians still fight for the reforms and rights they demanded in 2011.

The recent US Government policy decision to deliver arms provides much needed assistance to the armed Syrian opposition and may turn the tide of the conflict (see Appendix C). However, it will not prevent Syria's society from further fragmentation. US Government policy to establish a multi-sectarian




Figure 2. Idlib Governorate with main cities and towns. Idlib City, Jisr al-Shugour, and Ma'arat Numan lie along key routes of supply to Aleppo. Due to historic Ottoman-era governance, Idlib is economically and politically integrated with Aleppo rather than Damascus.

transitional structure is correct in principle but reliance on exiles in the SOC, detached from events on the ground, is a critical obstacle. *Therefore, the central UW objective should be to enable existing civilian governance structures to reframe the conflict and meaning of violence to the reform and rights based coalition of 2011 to encourage a broad, multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic defection away from the Assad regime and toward a new political system.*

The mechanisms to achieve these objectives can be found within Syrian civil society today. CACs are representative, often elected bodies found in liber-

ated territories. They function on the basis of good governance, provide basic services to the population, and demonstrate charity across sects and ethnicities.

The armed Syrian opposition is comprised mainly of local men and military defectors who formed military units to protect demonstrators and villages from repression by the Assad regime. These local units, many of which merged later under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), earned immediate legitimacy given their purpose and composition. The violence perpetrated in the name of the people was to protect their right to demonstrate on

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

US Government Assistance to Syria (Appendix C)

"The United States supports the Syrian people's aspirations for a democratic, inclusive, and unified post-Assad Syria...The United States is providing nearly \$815 million in humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the conflict. In addition, the United States has committed \$250 million in non-lethal transition support to the Syrian opposition. This assistance will help local opposition councils and civil society groups provide essential services to their communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of Syria. President Obama has also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The expansion of this assistance is aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the SMC to defend themselves against a repressive regime."

behalf of political reform, human rights, and economic opportunity regardless of ideology, sect, or ethnicity.

Lastly, nascent judicial bodies, free lawyers, and free judges are attempting to fill the void created by the civil war. They administer justice under the rule of law and align with CACs. They also provide a viable alternative to Sharia Courts that are gaining momentum and expanding their regional and national influence.

CACs, armed opposition units, and judicial bodies are active in cities like Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs; have utility with the population; and are evolving as a credible transitional governance system as the civil war continues. What they desperately require is resourcing and support for regional and national integration. In effect, at the local level Syrians themselves are forming the very governance structures the US Government advocates, but they remain atomized and strategically irrelevant due to their isolation. Conversely, the US Government sponsored SOC, has access to resources but little to no political legitimacy or influence with the population in Syria.

Existing Department of State (DOS) authorities and permissions make it possible to achieve the desired strategic political effect for the SOC. However, three coordinated activities must occur in order to develop SOC legitimacy with the population. The US Government must:

- 1) Reframe the narrative of the struggle, clearly illustrating the multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic composition of the Syrian opposition, both political and armed;
- 2) Align activities between the SOC, CACs, and Syrian opposition on the ground to **build Syrian civil society's capacity to self-organize**; and
- 3) Implement strategic communications supporting and disseminating the successes in Idlib Province.

These activities will establish the framework for an alternative political structure for which Syrians of all stripes are willing to sacrifice.

Reframing the Struggle

From the start, Bashar al-Assad framed the political opposition as “terrorists,” which in the Syrian context meant Radical Islamists. His goal was to break apart the multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic opposition by creating fear among minorities of a return to pre-Baath Syrian politics under which they were clearly marginalized.

The Alawite-Sunni frame of the fight that is now accepted in the West was the result of weapons and resources being disproportionately distributed to Sunni Salafist units during the course of 2012. Secular and moderate Sunni political groups and armed opposition units watched their influence wane as activist youth were drawn to Salafist units even though they did not subscribe to fundamentalist ideology. International resourcing gave credence to Assad's frame of the fight as a Sunni versus minority struggle causing minorities to reconsider their opposition to the Assad regime. It also convinced Western analysts that the Syrian civil war was a new front in the Sunni-Shiite struggle that vexed it in Iraq.

Despite increased tensions and numerous atrocities committed by both sides, Syrians at the local level still fear and resist the possibility of the civil war becoming an ethno-sectarian conflagration. The desire for representative politics, human rights, and economic opportunity still pervade Syrian society. However, the people-versus-dictator narrative linkages that bound them in 2011 have lost traction given the ubiquity of the acceptance of the “Sunni terrorist” frame made palpable by Jihadi and other Salafist armed opposition units.

To reset the Syrian civil war to its original purpose, a clear, tangible, politically inclusive alternative to the Assad regime must be presented to the Syrian population. This requires drawing in broader minority support and elevating the stature of the moder-

ate political and armed opposition units operative, but atomized, across the country. It is possible to encourage minority defection from the Assad regime if a third alternative is presented to the population. Should the majority of Christian, Druze, Kurd, and other communities resume anti-Assad activism, Assad's regime will fall if international assistance supports the Syrian opposition.

The political symbolism of the violence was allowed to be coopted by the Assad regime during 2012. It can be regained in 2013 with the right combination of activities and strategic messaging. At present, the population's choices are:

Al-Qunieh Catholic Church where Christians, Salafists, Free Lawyers, Free Judges, and community leaders agreed upon principles of justice in May 2013.



STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

- 1) Remaining under the Assad regime's repression or
- 2) Accepting Sunni Salafist repression under a future Muslim-dominated government.

A credible third political option is a representative and elected government. This is untenable and unbelievable at present because the Syrian opposition is completely disorganized, removed from the fight, and lacks legitimacy. Additionally, the CACs are largely incapacitated by a lack of resources and training. Under these conditions, reframing the narratives underlying the violence is impossible.

Coordinating SOC, CAC, and Moderate Syrian Opposition Activities

The fundamental elements required to build a credible, representative, transitional governance structure already exist. The CACs and many Syrian opposition units are very legitimate at the village, town, city and in some cases the provincial levels. While legitimate, they tend to be weaker than regionally and nationally oriented groups because they lack access to international support. Conversely, The SOC enjoys international support but almost no legitimacy inside Syria because it is unable to deliver resources and support when and where needed.

*A legitimate, transitional, multi-sectarian, and multi-ethnic governance structure rooted in representative politics and human rights can be forged by **linking the CACs' legitimacy with the SOC's access to resources.*** The multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic composition of each, along with both groups' demonstrated support for good governance, can generate a tangible government-in-exile that offers Syrians a better future than the Assad regime or Salafist oppression.

By emphasizing local, but regionally integrated, governance through CACs, the population can fight *for* an alternative instead of merely fighting *against* another. The key to building SOC credibility and legitimacy is to focus on the non-security aspects of governance and to make it a service provider to the already legitimate CACs rather than a distant "central government in waiting." The SOC's position as interlocutor with the Friends of Syria means the US DOS has already imbued it with all the authorities and permissions necessary to play this role. However, it is incapable of accomplishing its mission absent external assistance.



Fear of inadvertently aiding armed Salafist opposition units continues to inhibit effective and efficient delivery of resources to the Syrian population in liberated or contested territory. Ironically, these units are a clear minority of armed opposition units, but they garner the majority of Western attention. Secular, nominally religious, and observant armed opposition groups together heavily outnumber their Salafist counterparts, but suffer resource and media deficits. They are knowable, can be augmented, and made the face of the armed Syrian opposition unified against the Assad regime. A large percentage of these units currently subordinate their activities to CACs and see their role as defending their homes from repression whether from the Alawite

Assad regime or Sunni Salafist extremists.

Since their original purpose was the defense of home villages and towns to support demonstrations for political reform, human rights, and economic opportunity, it is possible to credibly reassert this narrative. Doing so achieves another strategic goal of the US Government, to marginalize armed Salafist units' influence. Salafist units affiliated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) will be bound to the human rights and representative politics platform espoused by it for decades and currently within the SOC.



On the other hand, Jihadi Salafists, such as Jabhat al-Nusrah, will reject this objective causing

- 1) A split in the Salafist fighting front, and
- 2) A divorce between the Jihadi Salafists and the Syrian population in a post-Assad environment.

Jihadi Salafists have never been welcome to Syrians in local governance; rather, they only have utility in the fight against Assad's military and for inter-sectarian conflict. Without their qualitative edge in weapons and humanitarian assistance,

their influence will quickly dissipate. *Emphasizing local governance as opposed to central government from Damascus prevents Salafists from achieving the sectarian relevance on which their entire strategy – and, ironically, Assad's – rests.*

Disseminating Success through Strategic Communications & Civil Society Networks

Implementing tangible activities to give credibility to the goal of an inclusive political system sponsored by the Syrian opposition requires strategic communications. Unfortunately, Syrian society is now hyper-localized due to distrust, impassable roads, and restricted communications. As an Arab society, relationships remain crucial for business and information exchange, even more so than technology-based means of communication. *Success in Idlib Governorate will be irrelevant unless the gains there can spark the imagination of others throughout Syrian society to achieve the same organization and political integration.*

The phased approach suggested here is as follows:

- (1) Generate a meaningful integration between the SOC, CACs, and moderate armed opposition units in Idlib Governorate;
- (2) Capture and disseminate the successes through strategic communications;
- (3) Augment Syria's diverse but nascent civil society networks to re-establish the political reform social movement of 2011;
- (4) Apply the model started in Idlib to liberated areas throughout Syria to generate cohesion and momentum and disseminate; and
- (5) Utilize the civil society networks to generate linkages across constituencies, ideologies, sects, and ethnicities.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT




Figure 3. Overview of CACs, Armed Syrian Opposition Units, and Villages assessed.

Civil society networks are abundant in Syria, from tribes to secular professional organizations. They have been weakened across the board by drought, repression, and war, but they still exist and can be enhanced. *Reconstituting and improving these networks are essential for providing support to communities even in the absence of central government or thoroughly coordinated CAC-SOC activities.*

Culturally, Syrians are a bureaucratically inclined people as evidenced by the formation of CACs and innumerable opposition groups. Tribal youth were among the first to rebel against the Assad regime in 2011, and many have formed cross-tribal

associations for mutual support. Free Lawyers and Free Judges are volunteering to establish courts in liberated territory to support the rule of law. Civil police forces are being created to maintain order and allow FSA units to focus on military operations. Each of these groups reaches into nearly every governorate of Syria and can be leveraged to expand the system of governance in the name of the SOC. In this way, building Syrian civil society's capacity to self-organize is a critical Unconventional Warfare objective and is again possible through existing DOS authorities and permissions.

Strategic Assessment of Idlib Governorate

Idlib Governorate's multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic, multi-tribal and self-governing population represents a direct threat to President Bashar al-Assad's portrayal of the conflict as a struggle between Sunni Salafist "terrorism" and secular rule of law. Idlib Governorate is the perfect location to reframe the meaning and purpose of the violence committed in the name of the Syrian people. Its history and traditions are rooted in peaceful relations between communities. Sunni Muslims, for instance, are currently refugees in and welcomed by Christian villages. Lastly, Idlib Governorate's location along the Turkish border allows for access to and delivery of resources and the ability to meet with international actors as needed.

Idlib Governorate also offers the ideal scenario to generate a substantive linkage between the SOC, CACs, and moderate armed Syrian opposition. The latter two already functionally work together and many CACs have minimal communication with the SOC. The multi-sectarian and multi-ethnic character of Idlib Governorate creates the precise image that is necessary to encourage defection from the Assad regime. Additionally, the population of Idlib Governorate is considered conservative relative to other locales. A clear demonstration of multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic, representative governance in Idlib will provide assurances to minorities in other areas of the viability of post-Assad political system in which their interests are secured and in which they can actively participate.

The scope of this study covers 23 liberated and contested villages and towns, 18 CACs and 91 armed Syrian opposition units in Idlib Governorate. Combined, the reach of the Syrian opposition extends well into two-thirds of the governorate from the Turkish border to the main highways leading to Aleppo from Damascus and Latakia (Figure 3). Approximately 50% of Northern Idlib villages fall under a 5 kilometer umbrella of influence of existing op-




Figure 4. 5KM sphere of influence of assessed CACs, Armed Syrian Opposition Units, and Villages.




Figure 5. Influence over all Idlib villages and towns.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT




Figure 6. Liberated and contested cities, towns, and villages.

position-held areas (see Figures 4 & 5).

Idlib Governorate's territory is very rugged from its northwestern border with Turkey to Idlib City aside from a very fertile, heavily cultivated valley in the center. Idlib City south to Ma'arat Numan levels out, but is more susceptible to Assad forces. However, aligning Idlib City, Ma'arat Numan, Saraqeb, and their surrounding villages to the SOC would effectively cut off Assad's Aleppo units from ground support.

The villages along the Turkish border have access to resources and contain Christian and Shiite populations. As Figure 6 shows, liberated villages are found along the main ground lines of communication aside from the M4 and M5 highway intersection at Saraqeb.

Figure 7 demonstrates the degree of religiosity of Idlib population. While known to be a conservative population relative to other parts of the Syria, the villages are broadly observant to devout, with only a few pockets of support for Salafist Islam. Consequently,




Figure 7. Idlib Governorate's population is very moderate in its religiosity and not a natural home to fundamentalists or extremists if the population has alternatives.

Idlib Governorate is not a natural home for fundamentalist Sunni government or for extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusrah. Organizations that espouse a secular to, at most, devout religious orientation will resound most with the Idlib population.

Agriculture is a principal industry in Idlib Governorate and an essential component of the Unconventional Warfare approach for this population. Figure 8 illustrates the villages reporting severe problems with their crops due to lack of inputs. Just as the Taliban have integrated with Afghan farmers, the SOC could generate significant rapport

with the population if its redresses the population's farming concerns.

Summary

Idlib Governorate is perfectly positioned to reframe the Syrian civil war from an Alawite-Sunni conflict to a fight for political reform and human rights. Its organically formed CACs and moderate armed Syrian opposition units are already cooperating at the local level and are considered legitimate by the population. While they lack capacity, they enjoy access to resources available across the Turkish

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT




Figure 8. Crop health map clearly shows widespread cultivation problems. This is a potential humanitarian problem or a key unconventional warfare opportunity.

border and could receive international support. The SOC has no legitimacy inside Idlib Governorate, but does have access to international resources. Combining the SOC's access to resources with the inherent legitimacy of Idlib's multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic CACs and moderate armed Syrian opposition units can create the foundation for a credible and inclusive transitional government system.

The remainder of the Study explains how to operationalize the UW approach outlined above and provides examples using information obtained from sources on the ground in Idlib. Achieving village stability promotes broader regional stability, better political integration, and creates the strategic communications optic necessary to offer Syrians a political structure worthy of their sacrifice.



OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

- ◇ Liberating Idlib Governorate will deny the Assad regime GLOCs to Aleppo, allow the SOC to relocate into Syria, permit refugees in Turkey to return, and provide an important symbol of multi-sectarian governance.
- ◇ Liberating Qarmide will secure the Idlib Opposition's center & clear the way to liberate Jisr al-Shugour, Idlib City, and villages south to Hamah.
- ◇ Securing nascent police, CACs, & basic needs with SOC support will allow armed Syrian opposition units to focus on fighting the Assad regime to liberate Qarmide.
- ◇ CACs are poorly resourced and disconnected from the SOC, preventing armed units from focusing on the battle.

A critical component in any Unconventional Warfare context is a society's ability to self-organize. In the case of Syria, a legitimate, multi-sectarian, civilian led transitional government must be established. *The key to creating a legitimate transitional government within Syria relies on linking the SOC to the population through CACs.* In so doing, the SOC will unite the Syrian opposition, develop a common narrative against the Assad regime, mitigate the influence of extremists, and achieve principle US policy objectives.

The SOC can achieve legitimacy and credibility with the population by delivering goods, providing basic services, and enhancing emerging moderate governance structures. Detailed information on the mechanisms and requirements needed to accomplish these objectives is thought to be unobtainable, but humanitarian and other networks operat-

ing inside Syria possess it.

Idlib Governorate's main cities, Idlib City and Jisr al-Shugour, have both strategic and emotional significance to the population and are, therefore, key political symbols. With Idlib Governorate liberated, a number of key political effects can occur:

- 1) The SOC can relocate into Syria to provide transitional governance;
- 2) The main Assad GLOCs to Aleppo will be severed, improving the opposition's chances of liberating it;
- 3) Prevent future refugee flows to Turkey and allow current refugees to return;
- 4) The Aleppo agricultural and mercantile market will be able to function, reducing




Figure 9. Qarmide remains a strategically important Assad regime village. Should Qarmide become liberated, the armed Syrian opposition believes it will be able to mass sufficient resources to take Jisr al-Shugour, Idlib City, and take control of all territory south to the outskirts of Hamah. With Jisr al-Shugour liberated and the M4 Highway contested, the Assad regime will lose its main lines of communication to Aleppo.

the humanitarian crisis and starvation potential among the population; and

- 5) Political momentum will swing back to the Syrian Opposition despite recent losses in Qusayr.

The key to liberating Idlib City and Jisr al-Shugour is taking the military base at Qarmide. Qarmide is

strategically located along the minor highways astride the central valley, lies in the center of opposition territory, and is within artillery range of most liberated territory. The Syrian opposition believes that liberating Qarmide would create a gateway for resources, arms, and equipment to support operations in Jisr al-Shugour and Idlib City (Figure 9). *In essence, liberating Qarmide creates a domino effect that cuts the Assad regime's ground lines of*

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT




Figure 10. Qarmide is located to the west of Idlib Governorate's central cultivated valley. Liberating Qarmide will provide operational freedom of movement for the armed Syrian opposition from the Turkish border, across central Idlib Governorate, and south to Ma'arat Numan.

communication to Aleppo from Latakia in the west and Hamah in the south.

With Idlib secure, the armed opposition would achieve relative freedom of movement from Idlib's border with Turkey to Al-Raqqah. This would allow the SOC to establish itself within Syria and become an internal influence as opposed to an external actor with no credibility.

However, to liberate Qarmide armed Syrian opposition units must be freed from providing local security and governance support to villages so they can turn their attention to fighting. Augmenting CACs' governance, police, and logistics capabilities are consequently strategic precursors to operational success in Idlib Governorate (Figure 10).

The Operational Assessment that follows provides an overview of the operating environment in Idlib Governorate. It explains the existing relationship

between the SOC and CACs, describes the disposition of armed opposition units, determines critical village humanitarian deficiencies the SOC can redress, describes the overall condition of village infrastructure, and determines the existing communications capability within the governorate. It also identifies the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities to coalesce CACs, armed Syrian opposition units, civil society networks, and the SOC.

Lastly, it analyzes the corridors open to transporting resources to CACs and associated villages with the least chance of inadvertently aiding Salafist, especially Jihadi, groups. Integrating these activities will generate a consolidated social movement within Idlib to recapture the reform narrative, reset the war back to its original purpose, and create a model for other regions.



OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Syrian Opposition Council Relationship with Civil Administrative Councils

As described in the Strategic Assessment section, the SOC is comprised of exiles who lack credibility and has no capacity to effectively distribute resources inside Syria. The SOC has two departments responsible for coordinating and delivering assistance to CACs in Syria. The Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) and Local Administrative Coordination Unit (LACU), were designed to be interlocutors between the SOC and CACs. They have not been imbued with the resources to deliver meaningful assistance, and each unit is crippled by systemic infighting and competition with one another rendering them both highly ineffective.

The SOC's strength is its multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic, and ideologically diverse composition and access to the Friends of Syria group of countries. This allows access to international humanitarian assistance and other resources. Fortunately, the SOC can be made relevant and legitimate over time by delivering critical resources to the population through locally legitimate CACs, even if the deliveries are in the name of the SOC and not with its direct administrative support.

Figure 11 illustrates the existing relationship the SOC has with Idlib CACs. *Of the 18 CACs in this study, only 2 are communicating with the SOC and receiving minimal supplies, 10 have periodic communication with it, and 6 have no contact whatsoever.* Under existing circumstances, it is impossible for the SOC to become a credible transitional governance structure.

Of the 91 armed Syrian opposition units in this study, 32 are known to subordinate their activities to the needs of the CACs and 55 are affiliated with the Supreme Military Council (SMC). Figure 12 shows that it is possible for resources to be delivered in the name of the SOC with a high probability of avoiding Salafist armed opposition units. Directing shipment and delivery through areas controlled by or under the influence of these units will prevent inadvertently assisting Salafist units while building the credibility of a moderate armed Syrian opposition.

Table 1 describes the political disposition, degree of religiosity, and access to information for each village within the study. The table suggests that Idlib's population still supports the political reform and human rights platform upon which the demonstrations were originally based.

While considered more religious and conservative than most other Syrian governorates, Idlib's population is not disposed to political Islam of either the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood or Jihadi Salafists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra. As a result, neither should be a natural governance choice for the overwhelming majority of Idlib's population if given a positive alternative.

Table 1 also illustrates the diversity of media resources utilized by the population. The SOC must be able to communicate across a wide variety of media in order to generate consistent interaction with the different communities inside Syria.




Figure 11. Idlib Governorate relationship with the Syrian Opposition Council. The overview indicates the SOC has no meaningful connections to the population inside Syria. Yellow indicates some Communication and Supplies emanating from the SOC, orange indicates some Communication only between CACs and the SOC, and red indicates no contact of any kind.

Figure 13 indicates that there are still gaps in the communications architecture, particularly around Jisr al-Shugour and Ma'arat Numan. Repairing or building out the communications system is a prerequisite to creating the image of a SOC capable of serving as a potential transitional governance structure.

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Village/Town/City	Political Value	Religiosity	News Type
Ad Dana	Representative	Observant	Internet Media
Adhar	Representative	Observant	Word of Mouth
Al-Bishiriya	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Al-Fa'aori	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Al-Farkeh	Representative	Observant	Word of Mouth
Al-Hamame		Observant	Private Media
Al-Janoudiah	Representative	Observant	
Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Yaqoubieh	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Arihah	Representative	Observant	Word of Mouth
Armanaz		Observant	Private Media
Bassamis		Devout	Private Media
Bdama		Nominally	
Beloun	Representative	Observant	Word of Mouth
Darkoush	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Haram	Representative	Nominally	Internet Media
Idlib City	Representative	Observant	National Media
Jisser Al'Shagour	Representative	Devout	Private Media
Kafr Awaid	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Khirbit Al'Jowz	Representative	Nominally	Internet Media
Ma'arat Misrin	Representative	Nominally	Private Media
Mishmishan	Representative	Devout	Word of Mouth
Salqin	Representative	Observant	Private Media
Sarmada	Representative		Internet Media
Sarmin	Representative	Observant	National Media
Shahbisho			

Table 1. Liberated Idlib Governorate villages, towns, and cities with their political values, degree of religiosity, and access to news media..




Figure 12. Armed Syrian Opposition subordinate to CACs and/or Supreme Military Council.




Figure 13. Village communications capability.

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Civil Administrative Councils

CAC Assessment:

CACs' primary focus is delivering resources to the population and many are having some success creating the outlines of formal governance. An *ad hoc* role is delivering security in areas where capacity exists but most are struggling to meet basic security needs. They require support coordinating their policies, practices, and entrenching the rule of law.

The quality of life governance aspects are a CAC weakness at this point, but offer the SOC a perfect opportunity to become relevant to the population. Medical care, infrastructure support, and educa-

tion are all essential needs for the population, but current areas of CAC deficiency. Concentrating on building CAC capacity in these areas could offer non-threatening yet high impact rapport-building effects with both the CACs and the population.

CACs when possible seek to fill the governance void across six main sectors:

- 1) Security,
- 2) Medical services,
- 3) Food distribution,




Figure 14. CACs providing for Security.



Figure 15. CACs providing justice services. Green are formal or informal legal bodies and yellow indicates councils of locally respected individuals.

- 4) Education,
- 5) Infrastructure, and
- 6) Justice.

At this point, only a few CACs have the requisite skills and resources to serve their communities across all sectors. Figures 14 through 19 provide an overview of existing CAC governance capacity by location.

Security is a core function of the CAC as demonstrated by Figure 14. Only 3 of 18 CACs currently lack the capacity to provide security services to their populations, while the remaining 15 struggle to provide this service. Many CACs sponsor police units comprised of regime police defectors and new local recruits.

Similarly Figure 15 illustrates that 11 of the 18 CACs sponsor local justice systems. 8 are councils of local notables, 2 have a formal legal structure supported

by Free Lawyers and Free Judges, and 1 has an informal system in operation.

Many of the CACs operating judicial councils desire integration into the formal opposition legal framework, but require assistance identifying Free Lawyers and Free Judges to assist them. Importantly, the Idlib population desires to build process-oriented, rule of law judicial structures as opposed to Sharia courts or other religiously-based institutions. Providing support in this sector could be a significant activity for both entrenching governance in liberated areas while generating a key optic for strategic communications.

Food distribution is another core activity of CACs, covered again by 15 of 18 CACs (Figure 16). Medical care is a weakness across CACs as demonstrated by Figure 17. Less than 50% of CACs have the capacity to provide support for local medical care.

As food and security become satisfied, expectations will turn to other quality of life factors, such as




Figure 16. CACs providing food distribution.




Figure 17. CACs providing medical care.

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infrastructure and education. Figures 18 and 19 suggest that these issues are potentially problematic for the CACs in the near future.

Figure 18 shows that only 6 of 18 CACs have the capacity to repair or build essential public infrastructure. Building indigenous capacity through training or creating a system of support could be an important activity for the SOC in the near future.

Figure 19 shows that education is a key deficiency among CACs. Only 6 are able to provide services in this area. While traditional education is important, providing skills training on basic survival skills and vegetable gardening should also be considered since food insecurity and insufficient medical care continue as problems in liberated areas. Additionally, Radical Islamists have steadily provided educational material to the local population, which threatens to radicalize youth in a clearly susceptible position.




Figure 18. CACs capable of repairing and maintaining infrastructure.




Figure 19. CACs providing educational services.



OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Police & Armed Syrian Opposition Units

Police and Armed Syrian Opposition Assessment:

The majority of Idlib Governorate's armed Syrian opposition units are moderate and integrated with the CAC and SMC structures. Their predominantly local to regional orientation means they enjoy solid legitimacy, though their resource deprivation prevents them from developing high influence with the population.

Civil Police units are in the process of being formed and have the potential to take over local security functions from moderate armed opposition units. Doing so would allow the fighting units to move on to strategic objectives, such as Jisr al-Shugour and Idlib City. Civil Police units are desperately short on uniforms, gear, and salary support. SOC support in these areas would achieve both a governance and strategic communications victory for the UW campaign.

Importantly, it is possible to identify the location of fundamentalist and extremist units and to deliver resources with minimal chance of inadvertently aiding them. Most communities have moderate forces in the area, but villages to the north and east of Idlib City require stronger moderate unit presence for this strategy to be effective.

Security in liberated areas is a combination of nascent, local police forces sponsored by CACs and armed Syrian opposition units who emanate from, traverse through, or operate in the territory. Unsurprisingly, there is a diverse group of objectives, orientations, skill sets, and relationships with both the CAC system and the Supreme Military Council. Vir-

tually no police and security units have even a minimal relationship with the SOC, but the SMC might be able to provide cover in the security sector.

Functioning police forces exist in 5 of the 23 villages in this study. Another 250 policemen have recently been trained, but they lack uniforms and basic policing gear. These symbolic components of policing are critical deficiencies. Uniformed police create the appearance of order, deter violence and crime, counter al-Nusrah, and build local confidence to engage in normal commerce. Providing basic uniforms and gear should be a top priority for the SOC.

The key strengths of the Civil Police include their intrinsic local legitimacy, their function of removing the security burden from the area armed opposition, and their reputation as a neutral security force. However, they still require salary support, training, and access to judicial structures to adjudicate crimes.

Of the 91 armed Syrian opposition units identified in this study, 8 are assessed as secular, 26 are nominally religious, and 10 are observant. These 44 units represent 48% of Idlib units and easily fall within the range of "moderate" forces with which the US the Government would be willing to work.

Figure 20 depicts the location of the moderate armed opposition units. They are concentrated mainly south of Idlib City and to the west of Jisr al-Shugour. The northern stretches of the governorate are devoid of these units. Figure 21 notes an important feature of Idlib's armed units. *There are 11 overtly multi-sectarian units operating in Idlib City*



Local police officers working toward stability and supported by our human networks. These police forces willingly subordinate their activities to local Civil Administrative Councils (CACs). March 2013, Khirbet al Joz, Idlib Governorate, Syria.

and south to Ma'arat Numan. These units present a direct threat to the Assad regime's narrative of the fight, and can be capitalized upon for strategic communications.

27 units are assessed to be religiously devout, but not Salafist. Only 15 units are assessed to be fundamentalist Salafist, and only one Jihadi Salafist extremist unit is identified. Together, the Salafist units comprise only 18% of the units, but they command respect for their resources and fighting skills.

Table 2 provides a detailed description of each unit's religiosity, relationship with the CACs and SMC, its influence level, and political orientation. What stands out is the large majority of moderate units subordinate their activities to both the CACs and the SMC. However, due to lack of resources and training, their influence level is predominantly low. Another important factor among these units is they stress a local to regional focus, which allows them to maintain strong linkages with the population.

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The devout units, do demonstrate a general willingness to subordinate their activities to the SMC, but not to the CACs. Most devout units are locally oriented, but have low influence. This is not necessarily a bad condition for the broader Unconventional Warfare campaign since it mitigates the perception that the Sunni population supports an Islamic government. Yet the moderate forces will need to improve their relative standing and ability to provide resources to the devout units to allay minority fears.

The Salafist fundamentalist and extremist units do not subordinate their activities to either the CACs or the SMC. Their predominantly national level focus naturally divorces them from the local population leading to low influence with average Idlib citizens. Were their fighting prowess and access to resources matched by moderate units, they would find it difficult to become a dominant factor in a post-Assad environment.

Figure 22 depicts the locations of units subordinate to the CACs. Locations in green are subordinate to the CACs, locations in red are not subordinate to the CACs, and locations in orange have a mixture of units.

Figure 23 shows the general locations of the units as a function of religiosity. Salafist units are concentrated along the northern and eastern edges of Idlib City or have fewer moderate units in the same areas (see also Figure 25). Importantly, areas in yellow and orange have a mixture of moderate and fundamentalist units. Figure 20 below illustrates that it is possible to engage moderate forces to ensure delivery of essential resources to the population.

Devout units (Figure 24) can also be leveraged effectively since they are located across the governorate and fall in line with the religiosity of the local population. Their predominantly local orientation means that they will likely avoid the appearance of




Figure 20. Secular, nominally religious, and observant Armed Syrian Opposition Units.




Figure 21. Multi-sectarian Armed Syrian Opposition Units.

Unit Name	Affiliated Units	Religiosity	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Influence Level
Idlib Military Council		Secular	Yes	Yes	High
Idlib Military Council	Sout al-Haq Battalion	Secular		Yes	High
Idlib Military Council	Dir' al-Shamal Battalion	Secular		Yes	High
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Mahir Hammoush Battalion	Secular	Yes	Yes	Low
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Hurras al-Thawra al-Suriya Company	Secular		Yes	Low
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Shouber Ibraheem Company	Secular		Yes	Low
Idlib Military Council	Saif al-Haq Battalion	Secular		Yes	High
15 A'dhar Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
al-Shuhada Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
al-Nour Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Dir al-Jazeera Brigade		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Haramain Company		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Shuhada Kafr Rooma Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Azzar Battalion		Nominally	Yes	No	Moderate
Darkoush Local Battalion		Nominally	Yes	No	Moderate
Dere al-Jazeera Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Fidaee al-Thawra Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
FSA		Nominally	No	No	Moderate
FSA Brigade 111		Nominally	Yes		Moderate
Furqan Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	High
Furqan Battalion	Al-Shemah Company	Nominally		Yes	High
Furqan Battalion	Ahwaz Company	Nominally		Yes	High
Hamza and Abbas Battalion		Nominally		Yes	Low
Idlib Military Council	Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Battalion	Nominally	Yes	Yes	High
Idlib Military Council	Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Battalion	Nominally	Yes	Yes	High
Idlib Military Council	Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Battalion	Nominally	Yes	Yes	High
Mohammed al-Amin Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Omar al-Mukhtar Battalion		Nominally		Yes	Low
Raad Battalion		Nominally		Yes	Low
Shuhada al-Fatteeni Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Sons of Walid Battalion		Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Sons of Walid Battalion	Al Orabi Martyr's Company	Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low
Sons of Walid Battalion	Abdel Rouf al-Muwazin Company	Nominally	Yes	Yes	Low

Table 2. Idlib Governorate armed Syrian opposition units, including their degree of religiosity, willingness to subordinate to the CACs and SMC, and their influence level with the population.

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Unit Name	Affiliated Units	Religiosity	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Influence Level	Political Objective
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Hamza Al-Khateeb Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Ahrar Al-Mawaly Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Janoudieh Hawks Battalion		Observant	No	No	Low	Local
Fursan al-Haq Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Janoudieh Martyrs Brigade		Observant	No	No	Moderate	Local
Khirbet al Joz Battalion		Observant	Yes	No	Moderate	Local
Tahrir Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Hamza Battalion		Observant	Yes	Yes	Low	Local
Fajrul-Islam Battalion		Devout	No	No	Low	Local
ahfad al-Umawiyeen		Devout	No	No	Low	Local
Al-Haq Battalion		Devout	No	Yes	Low	Regional
Dar al'Haq		Devout	No	No	Low	Local
Dhiqar Battalion		Devout	No	Yes	Low	Regional
Farouq Regiment in the North		Devout	Yes	Yes	Low	Regional
Hamsa al-Khateeb		Devout	No		Low	Local
Janoud al-Haq Battalion		Devout	Yes	Yes	Moderate	Local
Janoud al-Haq Battalion	Bara 'ibn Malik Company	Devout		Yes	Moderate	Local
Janoud al-Haq Battalion	Al Mahajery Company	Devout		Yes	Moderate	Local
Janoud al-Haq Battalion	Al-Ansar Company	Devout		Yes	Moderate	Local
Lewa Samih (Kata'ib)		Devout	No	No	Low	Local
Qisas Battalions		Devout	No		Low	Local
Qisas Battalions	Qisas le-Hraer Suriyah Battalion	Devout			Low	Local
Qisas Battalions	Qisas Baba Amr Battalion	Devout			Low	Local
Qisas Battalions	Qisas Shehada Suriyah Battalion	Devout			Low	Local
Shakour al-Sham		Devout	No	Yes	High	Regional
Suqour al-Sham Brigade		Devout	No	Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ansar al-Haq Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Abu Al-fdal al Abaas Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Al-Muhajreen wal-Ansar Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ze Qar Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Al-Khansa Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Al-Sheed Muhammad al-Abdullah Bat	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Daoud Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Muhamad al-Khalif Battalion	Devout		Yes	High	National
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		Devout	No	Yes	Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion	Dhi Qar Company	Devout		Yes	Low	Local

Unit Name	Affiliated Units	Religiosity	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Influence Level	Political Objective	
Ahrar al-Sham		Fundamentalist	No	No	Moderate	Regional	
Ahrar al-Sham		Fundamentalist	Yes	No	Low	Regional	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Tawhid wa Iman Battalion	Fundamentalist	No	No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	al Shima Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	al Farqan Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Sariyah al-Jebel Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Green Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Abad al Rahman Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Furqan Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Janoud al-Haq Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Hussein Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Jabir bin Abdullah Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Demna al Qutab Company	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Sufian Thawri Battalion	Fundamentalist		No	Low	National	
Ansar al-Sham		Fundamentalist		No	No	Low	Regional
Jabhat al-Nusra		Extremist		No	No	Moderate	National




Figure 22. Armed Syrian Opposition Units subordinate to the CACs. Areas in green have units working with the CACs, yellow and orange areas have a mix of units, and areas in red have units that will not subordinate their activities to the CACs.




Figure 23. Religiosity of Armed Syrian Opposition Units. Most areas along the Turkish border have mixed moderate and fundamentalist units. Northeast Idlib has the strongest concentration of fundamentalist units.

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animating minorities' fears while providing tangible service to the population. So long as the units work with or through the SMC, an adverse UW optic should be avoided.

Coordinating resource deliveries from the SOC to the CACs through moderate and devout forces can counteract the influence being generated by Jihadi Salafist units. Jihadi Salafists integrate humanitarian assistance with their military activities, while the moderate forces tend to separate functions. The Jihadis are making inroads with the population based on their tactics and the level of desperation

felt by the population. Reversing this trend requires linking all the elements of governance together through the main coordinating bodies.






Figure 24. Devout Armed Syrian Opposition Units.




Figure 25. Fundamentalist and extremist Armed Syrian Opposition Units.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Basic Needs

Basic Needs Assessment:

The Idlib population suffers from severe deficiency across the basic needs categories. Without immediate external assistance, the situation will become **desperate as Fall settles in.** The population's current level of deprivation offers the SOC a perfect opportunity to build relevance and credibility if resources are delivered on its behalf.

While food, medical care, and fuel are obvious immediate needs, providing assistance with the agricultural production and distribution cycles could have more political impact over the coming two years. Maximizing the harvest, facilitating sale and distribution, and offering aid to repair damaged fields or orchards could help restore area self-sufficiency, prevent another humanitarian and refugee crisis in 2014, and allow the SOC to build networks and relationships across sects and ethnicities on a key quality of life issue that resonates in every governorate.

While CACs endeavor to provide governance support for their communities' basic needs, Table 3 indicates that deprivation is still the predominant experience for most. Across the board, the Idlib population is suffering from severe deficiencies in food and essential cooking and heating fuels. Ominously, the agricultural conditions in this farming area suggest that starvation and depleted family wealth will persist for years without coherent assistance with inputs and access to markets.

Food Insecurity is a critical deficiency for the population. 12 of 23 communities are in dire need of food while another 10 have just enough to survive.

Figure 26 shows the distribution of food insecurity, with concentrations along the Turkish border and from Jisr al-Shugour to Ma'arat Numan.

Exacerbating this problem is the fact that cooking oil and fuel is also a critical shortage for 87% of the population. Without oil and fuel, and with many bakeries targeted for destruction by the Assad regime, the population struggles to prepare even basic meals. Figure 27 shows that this problem is equally distributed and should be a priority for SOC assistance.

As mentioned above, agriculture is a principal industry in Idlib Governorate, but the civil war has dis-




Figure 26. Food security.

Village/Town/City	Cooking Preparation Security	Crop Health	Food Security	Heating Fuel Security	Medical Security
Ad Dana	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Sufficient	Inadequate
Adhar	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Al-Bishriya	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Al-Fa'aori	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Al-Farikeh	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Al-Hamame	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Al-Janoudiah	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence		Inadequate
Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Yaqoubieh	Adequate	Adequate	Below Subsistence	Sufficient	Adequate
Arihah	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Armanaz	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Bassamis	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Bdama	Inadequate	Adequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Adequate
Belion	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Darkoush	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Adequate
Haram	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Idlib City	Adequate	Inadequate	Above Subsistence	Sufficient	Adequate
Jisr al-Shagour	Adequate		Above Subsistence	Sufficient	Adequate
Kafr Awaid	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Khirbet al-Joz	Inadequate	Adequate	Below Subsistence		Adequate
Ma'arat Misrin	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Mishmishan	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Salqin	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Sarmada	Inadequate	Inadequate	Below Subsistence	Sufficient	Inadequate
Sarmin	Inadequate	Inadequate	Subsistence	Insufficient	Inadequate
Shahbisho					Inadequate

Table 3. Overview of the basic needs conditions in liberated Idlib Governorate villages, towns, and cities .

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

rupted production for three reasons. First, transportation has been cut off limiting the availability of both inputs and access to market. Second, the Assad regime has destroyed thousands of acres of orchards and crop land to deprive the opposition of much needed food and wealth. Orchard destruction is particularly devastating because many trees take five years or longer to become productive. Third, the 2012-2013 winter was particularly harsh, causing widespread damage to trees and seedlings.

Restoring or reaping as much agricultural yield as possible is essential for this population since Syria adopted a food autarky policy in the late 1960s and does not have extensive market ties to make up production losses through international purchase. *Maximizing yield within Syria is a key area of opportunity open to the SOC since farming touches all sects and all ethnicities, is an apolitical issue around which all Syrians can unite, and has resonance across Syria's governorates.* Building SOC capacity in this area can build immediate credibility but also allay imminent humanitarian crises in the absence of action.

Medical care is uniformly in short supply. Figure 28 shows some concentration of access along the western border with Turkey, but broadly remains deficient. Mobile field hospitals have been established in Harim, Khirbet al-Joz, and Yaqoubieh, but more support is needed.

Heating fuel is similarly positioned (Figure 29). 6 of the 23 villages have sufficient supplies while 17 are in short supply. Though heating fuel is less a concern in the summer months, Idlib is a mountainous territory, and nights become cold starting in September. Establishing the infrastructure for heating fuel delivery now is an important activity to avoid crisis in a few months.




Figure 27. Cooking fuel security.




Figure 28. Medical security.




Figure 29. Heating fuel security.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Humanitarian Assistance & Refugees

Humanitarian Assistance Assessment:

The humanitarian assistance condition requires immediate attention on education and mattresses and blankets for refugees. The refugees are concentrated, which should ease distribution. Additionally, infant formula and milk assistance is needed throughout the governorate.

Table 4 illustrates Idlib Governorate's humanitarian assistance deficiencies. Fortunately, not all sectors require immediate attention.

Education stands out as the most critical humanitarian assistance need for political as well as practical purposes. *Jihadi Salafist units are providing education materials and instruction in areas lacking these services. Implementing a moderate educa-*




Figure 30. Education.




Figure 31. Milk assessment.

Village/Town/City	Humanitarian Need - Education Materials	Humanitarian Need - Milk	Humanitarian Need - Shelter	Humanitarian Need - Mattresses	Water Quality
Ad Dana	Insufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Potable
Adhar	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Al-Bishiriya	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Al-Fa'aori	Insufficient	Insufficient		Insufficient	Impotable
Al-Farikeh	Insufficient	Insufficient		Insufficient	Potable
Al-Hamame	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Al-Janoudiah	Insufficient	Insufficient		Insufficient	
Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Yaqoubieh	Sufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Arihah	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Armanaz	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	
Bassamis	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	
Bdama	Sufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Belion	Insufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient	Impotable
Darkoush	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Impotable
Haram	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Potable
Idlib City	Sufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Jisr al-Shagour	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Potable
Kafr Awaid	Insufficient	Insufficient		Insufficient	Potable
Khirbet al-Joz	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Potable
Ma'arat Misrin	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Mishmishan					
Salqin	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Impotable
Sarmada	Insufficient	None	Sufficient	Insufficient	Potable
Sarmin	Insufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Sufficient	Potable
Shahbicho	Insufficient	None	Insufficient	Sufficient	Potable

Table 4. Overview of the humanitarian assistance conditions in liberated Idlib Governorate villages, towns, and cities.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

tion curriculum across the governorate is immediately required to prevent the radicalization of Idlib' youth. Under existing circumstances and in an environment charged with sectarian tension, radical messaging has currency with impressionable minds.

SOC support along this key line of assistance is important for both the political and strategic communications elements. Figure 30 shows widespread need and little clustering of existing capacity.

Similarly, infant milk or formula is another key need as illustrated by Figure 31. 5 communities have managed to achieve sufficiency on this need, but 18 still require immediate support.

Figure 32 depicts the concentration of refugees inside Idlib Governorate. Most are found around the outskirts of Jisr al-Shugour on the western side of the governorate. Figures 34 and 35 show corresponding deficiencies in humanitarian assistance for mattresses and blankets, respectively. Despite the large number of refugees in Idlib governorate, most communities have sufficient shelter for residents and refugees.

Water is generally potable with only three communities where this is a key concern (Figure 36). Nevertheless, because water is essential to all aspects of life, SOC assistance to these villages is crucial.




Figure 33. Mattresses.




Figure 34. Blankets.




Figure 32. Refugee density.




Figure 35. Shelter.




Figure 36. Water Quality.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Infrastructure

Infrastructure Assessment:

From a UW perspective, Idlib Governorate's infrastructure is in relatively workable condition. The main roads and electrical system can be improved without extraordinary assistance, and the villages requiring significant internal repairs are mainly along the Turkish border.

The communication infrastructure is a critical deficiency for the UW campaign. Nearly half of villages are unable to communicate with regional or external allies, which makes communication with the SOC untenable. Cell phone coverage must be ex-

panded to empower civil society networks and prevent concentrated access for a few influential actors. For the SOC to become credible and relevant to Syrians, communities' needs must be directly communicated to it and the resources quickly delivered. Ensuring communications and passage over roads are essential prerequisites.

Idlib Governorate's infrastructure is basically intact, but requires significant support for a successful Unconventional Warfare campaign. Here again the SOC can have significant impact with the population since the resources are unavailable inside Syria. The SOC's access to international resources and expertise can be applied to these infrastructure




Figure 37. Village communications capability.




Figure 38. Village auto fuel access.

Village/Town/City	Infrastructure - Communications	Infrastructure - Electricity	Infrastructure - Auto Fuel	Infrastructure Roads
Ad Dana	Regional Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Fuel Distribution Working	Paved Passable
Adhar	No Communication Equipment	Grid Power Destroyed	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Damaged
Al-Bishiriya	Local Communication Only		Insufficient Fuel	Paved Damaged
Al-Fa'aori	Local Communication Only	No Power	Insufficient Fuel	Unpaved Passable
Al-Farikh		Grid Power Destroyed	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Al-Hamame	Local Communication Only	Portable Generator Power	No Fuel	Unpaved Passable
Al-Janoudiah	Local Communication Only	Grid Power Destroyed	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Yaqoubieh	No Communication Equipment	Grid Power Destroyed	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Arihah	Regional Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Armanaz	Local Communication Only	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Bassamis	Local Communication Only	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Bdama	National Communication - Insufficient	No Power	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Belloun	No Communication Equipment	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Darkoush	National Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Damaged
Haram	Regional Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Damaged
Idlib City	National Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Working	Fuel Distribution Working	Paved Passable
Jisser Al'Shagour	Local Communication Only	Grid Power Working	Fuel Distribution Working	Paved Passable
Kafr Awaid	Local Communication Only	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Khirbit Al'Jowz	Regional Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Working	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Ma'arat Misrin	National Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Mishmishan	Local Communication Only	No Power	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Salqin	Regional Communication - Insufficient	Grid Power Working	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Sarmada	Regional Communication - Sufficient	Grid Power Damaged	Insufficient Fuel	Unpaved Passable
Sarmin	Regional Communication - Insufficient	Grid Power Working	Insufficient Fuel	Paved Passable
Shahbisho				

Table 5. Overview of the infrastructure conditions in liberated Idlib Governorate villages, towns, and cities .

problems to restore some semblance of governance and normalcy for the population. Moreover, with effective infrastructure, the SOC could relocate into Idlib Province.

Table 5 suggests that core electrical and road infrastructure can be leveraged with some repair. Auto fuel is a critical deficiency across communities.

Most importantly for the UW campaign, however, the communications network needs immediate attention.

11 of 23 villages have either no communications capability or can only communicate locally. Figure 37 indicates this problem is worst from the western border with Turkey to Jisr al-Shugour and its outskirts.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Overcoming this communications deficit is crucial for linking the SOC to the population through the CACs. Another 8 communities have regional communications capability, but 2 require enhancement. 3 communities have national level communications access, and another 3 are undetermined at this time. While augmenting the communications architecture is essential, building relationships with the area CACs will require simultaneous effort.

Turkey has expanded cellular phone coverage up to 40 kilometers into Idlib, but there are significant obstacles with this service. The serviceable cell phones must be of Turkish origin or they require Turkish sim cards. Additionally, the phones only last a short period of time. US Department of State provided communications equipment is similarly experiencing problems in the field. The radios that concentrate comms to a few people, but this limits civil society networks from forming.

Figure 38 illustrates that auto fuel is a key deficiency across the board. There are insufficient supplies of fuel all along the Turkish border and villages south of Jisr al-Shugour.

Main road infrastructure is largely navigable. Figure 39 shows only a few communities require immediate road repair, though the pair of villages to the east of the cultivated valley are on a key road to Idlib City.

Inside villages and towns, the roads are in worse condition. Most locations have been shelled by the Assad regime, resulting in significant damage to roads and other infrastructure. Repair assistance by the SOC on these needs would result in immediate dividends.

Electricity is predominantly a key deficiency for the population north of Jisr al-Shugour along the Turkish border. As noted by Figure 40, Idlib City and the




Figure 39. Road condition.





Figure 40. Electricity.

areas to the north and south have access to the electrical grid, though 10 of the 23 communities

need repairs to make the grid functional. Another 4 villages require extensive repair to the grid.



OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Lines of Communication

The Idlib Governorate opposition has developed a decent system of materiel distribution with five main hubs based in Haram, Bab al-Hawa, Darkoush, Ad Dana, and Saraqeb. The most important highways that are being used for distribution of resources are 56, 60, and M5/45.

Figure 41 illustrates the general reach of the main distribution hubs and notes the impact of regime-held Qarmide on the ability of the opposition to provide coverage of supplies across the governorate. Figure 42 depicts the eleven main and secondary distribution hubs, which show relatively good access to liberated areas.

Bab al-Hawa is the primary logistics hub for the ma-

jority of all humanitarian aid, including medicine, food stuffs, blankets, and other essentials. From here, resources flows along the highway to Sarmada and then onto other parts of the province.

Saraqeb is the main logistics hub for supplies flowing into the southern areas of the province and helps supply the Ad Dana hub. Until recently, the opposition could move supplies freely along Highway M5/45, but in April 2013 the regime retook critical areas along the highway. The opposition must currently use back roads to transport supplies around the roadblocks. The Saraqeb hub also uses Highway 60 to move arm supplies from Saraqeb into Sarmin to the northwest and to resupply Nayrab and Arihah to the west, but only limited




Figure 41. Idlib opposition distribution hubs.



Figure 42. Overview of opposition logistics nodes.

goods are transported to these locations currently.

Darkoush is the main logistics hub for supplies flowing to the western parts of the governorate and supplies the al-Qunieh hub. It is also one of the most important hubs for moving supplies into Jisr al-Shugour for the ongoing fight against regime forces in the city.

Harim is the logistics hub that supplies the northern liberated villages. Supplies travel southwest to Salqin, Armanaz, and other areas to the along the highway. The Harim hub supplies small quantities of medicine, weapons and ammunition, and some more general humanitarian aid such as school supplies, clothing, and blankets.

Figure 43 indicates that 7 of the 11 nodes attempt to provide for food distribution. Figure 44 shows that there are two main weapons hubs serving the northern and southern armed opposition units. Tables 6 and 7 show that there is both a moderate unit and a fundamentalist unit operating out of Saraqeb, but Harim does not have a local armed op-

position unit based out of it. However, fundamentalist units traverse through the Harim area more than moderate forces, which could set the stage for radicalization or difficulties establishing civil governance in this area if moderate units or civil local police are not introduced soon.

Figures 45 and 46 suggest that humanitarian assistance and medical supply distribution have reasonably good coverage with important exceptions in the al-Qunieh and Khirbet al-Joz hub areas. Educational supplies (Figure 47) are handled by all but 2 logistics nodes and are well positioned throughout liberated territory.

Tables 6 and 7 clearly show that the preponderance of armed Syrian opposition units around the logistics nodes are moderate units, and most are subordinate to the CACs and/or SMC. Al-Qunieh and Bdama are the only nodes that have an equal balance of fundamentalist and moderate units.

The Bab al-Hawa, Harim, and Ad Dana hubs have no armed opposition units operating from them. Ad




Figure 43. Food distribution capability of logistics nodes.




Figure 44. Weapons distribution capability of logistics nodes.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT




Figure 45. Humanitarian assistance distribution capability of logistics nodes.




Figure 46. Medical supply distribution capability of logistics nodes.



Unit Name	Affiliated Units	Village/Town/City	Religiosity	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC
Khirbet al Joz Battalion		Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Ya-qoubieh	Observant	Yes	No
Hamsa al-Khateeb		Bdama	Devout	No	
FSA Brigade 111		Bdama	Nominally	Yes	
Lewa Samih (Kata'ib)		Darkoush	Devout	No	No
Darkoush Local Battalion		Darkoush	Nominally	Yes	No
FSA		Darkoush	Nominally	No	No
Dhi Qar Battalion		Idlib City	Devout	No	Yes
Farouq Regiment in the North		Idlib City	Devout	Yes	Yes
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion	Dhi Qar Company	Idlib City	Devout		Yes
Furqan Battalion	Al-Shemah Company	Idlib City	Nominally		Yes
Furqan Battalion	Ahwaz Company	Idlib City	Nominally		Yes
Sons of Walid Battalion		Idlib City	Nominally	Yes	Yes
Sons of Walid Battalion	Al Orabi Martyr's Company	Idlib City	Nominally	Yes	Yes
Sons of Walid Battalion	Abdel Rouf al-Muwazin Company	Idlib City	Nominally	Yes	Yes
Hamza Al-Khateeb Battalion		Idlib City	Observant	Yes	Yes
Idlib Military Council		Idlib City	Secular	Yes	Yes
Idlib Military Council	Sout al-Haq Battalion	Idlib City	Secular		Yes
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Mahir Hammoush Battalion	Idlib City	Secular	Yes	Yes
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Hurras al-Thawra al-Suriya Company	Idlib City	Secular		Yes
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib	Shouber Ibrahim Company	Idlib City	Secular		Yes
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Devout	No	Yes
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Nominally	Yes	Yes
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Nominally	Yes	Yes
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Observant	Yes	Yes
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Observant	Yes	Yes
Tahrir Battalion		Jisr al Shugour	Observant	Yes	Yes
Dar al-Haq		Khirbet al-Joz	Devout	No	No
Shakour al-Sham		Khirbet al-Joz	Devout	No	Yes
Furqan Battalion		Saraqeb	Nominally	Yes	Yes

Table 6. Moderate and Devout armed Syrian opposition units at the main distribution nodes.

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Unit Name	Affiliated Units	Village/Town/City	Religiosity	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC
Ahrar al-Sham		Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Ya-qoubieh	Fundamentalist	Yes	No
Jabhat al-Nusra		Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, Ya-qoubieh	Extremist	No	No
Ahrar al-Sham		Bdama	Fundamentalist	No	No
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Hussein Battalion	Darkoush	Fundamentalist		No
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Green Battalion	Idlib City	Fundamentalist		No
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion	Jisir al-Shugour	Fundamentalist		No
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade	Furqan Battalion	Saraqeb	Fundamentalist		No

Table 7. Fundamentalist and Extremist armed Syrian opposition units at the main distribution nodes.

Dana lies in territory with moderate forces according to Figures 20, 21, and 23. Unfortunately, both Bab al-Hawa and Harim are located in areas without moderate units' presence. Fundamentalist units are known to pass through this area, which creates the potential for supplies to be diverted unless regionally focused moderate forces can coordinate their presence with the delivery.

Alternatively, Harim, Sarmada, and Salqin all have functioning CACs and are assessed as religiously moderate. Providing these villages with Civil Police could ensure the safety of SOC-sponsored supply deliveries against fundamentalist and extremist unit commandeering.

Lines of Communication Assessment

Idlib Governorate has a solid foundation for lines of communication in terms of distribution and adapta-




Figure 47. Education supply distribution capability of logistics nodes.

bility to changing ground circumstances. The key limiting factor is access to resources. The Assad regime's position in Qarmide interrupts the flow of resources across liberated territory and, along with positions in Idlib City and Jisr al-Shugour, prevents the logistics hubs from becoming contiguous.

The preponderance of armed Syrian opposition units located around the logistics nodes are considered moderate and most are subordinate to the CACs and/or SMC. Only in the northern section of the governorate are fundamentalist units the predominant presence. Coordinating delivery with or

through moderate units is possible in most locations and Civil Police can be used to augment them where they do not operate.



OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Regime Communication

In 2008, Greece's Intracom S.A. and Italy's Selex Elsag, a unit of Finmeccanica S.p.A., began construction of a Syria-wide encrypted communications network. The system constructed, called terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA) provides secure, long-range communications to support Assad regime's security forces. *TETRA allows secure, encrypted communications from vehicles and helicopters*

which enables regime security forces to coordinate military operations against dissidents and FSA units. TETRA infrastructure and equipment includes; 130 base stations, four command-and-control centers, dispatch stations, core switches, including antennae, microwave radio equipment and air-conditioning systems and, 17,000 Selex radios




Figure 48. Locations of Idlib Governorate Tetra Towers.




Figure 49. Tetra Tower Coverage in Idlib Governorate.

across Syria. Additionally, more than 11,000 walkie-talkies, 3,500 mobile radio units for use in vehicles, 1,600 radio dispatch consoles, 1,400 motorcycle-mounted units, 60 marine units, and 30 avionic transceivers for use in helicopters are currently deployed across the country.

Figure 48 illustrates the locations of the microwave antennas located in Idlib. Figure 49 illustrates the coverage areas using a 40KM, line of sight range. This information is provided in order to assist military

planners to planners to disrupt communications. Specific information including; exact GPS locations, height of dishes located on antenna towers and, detailed description of the facility are available. Additionally, this information is available for the entire country.

TACTICAL ASSESSMENTS

- ◇ Linking the SOC to Existing Villages and CACs
- ◇ Leveraging FSA Units
- ◇ Enabling Civil Society

The Tactical Assessments section of the Study provides detailed information and assessments of the security, logistics, and governance elements for individual villages in Idlib Province. Each Tactical Assessment provides recommendations on how to channel appropriate, required resources to villages and improve the governance condition of that village. By doing so, it addresses the UW objective to generate relevance and credibility for the SOC and meet the needs of the population through targeted delivery of essential resources.

Each village assessment design follows the seven step process described on the next page. Tactical Assessments for each village in Idlib are listed in alphabetical order. The only exception to this is Jisr al-Shugour, which is presented first. Jisr al-Shugour demonstrates the level of fidelity that can be achieved through this study's methodology. In addition to the standard assessment, the Jisr al-Shugour case study includes a link schematic of the area CACs, a link chart of the main CAC members according to position, and a link chart of the armed opposition units operating in Jisr al-Shugour. When combined, they demonstrate how to deliver resources, in the name of the SOC, to the population through know, trusted individuals and governance structures.


The network analysis supplemental provides a snapshot of the available information gleaned by working through Syrian CAC networks. With dedicated support, the social network analysis can be expanded across villages, governorates, and civil society associations. Analysis conducted along these

lines can provide a comprehensive operational understanding across Syria and better position the US Government to provide political and material assistance.

- 1) Determine the capability of CACs to communicate with the SOC;
- 2) Establish means for all CACs to communicate with the SOC;
- 3) Determine the transportation routes to each CAC and identify moderate armed Syrian opposition units to facilitate the transfer;
- 4) Determine the essential needs of each community;
- 5) Begin delivery of essential supplies to CACs in the name of the SOC in coordination with moderate armed opposition units and civil society;
- 6) Have each CAC communicate its needs to the SOC;
- 7) Ensure delivery of essential needs to CACs within a few days of communicating with the SOC.



JISR AL-SHUGOUR TOWN ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Representative**

Control Status: **Contested**

SOC Resources: **Communication & Supplies**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●			●			

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Formal Legal				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion	Mahmoud al-Kanash	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Tahrir Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade							
Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Linking Jisr al-Shugour to the SOC:

Jisr al-Shugour is a key strategic town located along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It is currently contested by the Assad regime with many Sunnis taking refuge in Christian villages. It has a functioning CAC and despite capacity along most lines of operation, the Jisr al-Shugour CAC only has village area communication capacity.

The Jisr al-Shugour Military Council is comprised of 5 brigades and is commanded by a civilian revolutionary commander, Moustafa Bidaq, and a defected Colonel, Hussein Alwan. They demonstrate strong support for both CACs and the SMC. The town can best be resourced by using the Darkoush hub in coordination with the following units:

- 1) Jisr al-Shugour Military Council
- 2) Abnaa Aisha Battalion
- 3) Al-Amir Hamad Battalion



To avoid empowering certain groups by delivering resources, the SMC should be engaged to support the CACs in Jisr al-Shugour. The observant units in the area should be engaged because they demonstrate support for the both the CACs and SMC.

Immediate SOC assistance to Jisr al-Shugour should focus on communications equipment with a regional reach. Private media is available, but the town needs to be incorporated into a wider information network for the full strategic communications effect to be realized. Because regime forces still control parts of the town, access to resources are greater here than in other fully liberated villages.

Due to its regime occupation, delivering resources to Jisr al-Shugour in the name of the SOC is virtually impossible. However, planning should commence with the CACs for delivery of essential resources once it becomes liberated. When liberated, delivering resources to Jisr al-Shugour will likely take only a few hours travel time. Until regional communication can be established, CAC discussions with the SOC should be coordinated with moderate units possessing appropriate communication capability.



Figure 50. US Senator John McCain (R—AZ) standing with SMC leader BG Salim Idris (left of SEN McCain) and Jisr al-Shugour Military Council leaders, Moustafa Bidaq and Colonel Hussein Alwan (right of SEN McCain).

Jisr al-Shugour's CAC composition is very robust, consisting of three districts. The

JISR AL-SHUGOUR TOWN ASSESSMENT




Figure 51. Link chart of the Main JISR al-Shugour CAC (in center) with its affiliated District Two and District Three CACs. Districts Two and Three provide some minimal governance support to JISR al-Shugour’s outlying neighborhoods and nearby villages.

JISR AL-SHUGOUR TOWN ASSESSMENT




Figure 52. Social network chart of the principle leadership of the main Jisr al-Shugour CAC and their positions.

main district focuses on the town, while Districts Two and Three have 14 and 17 affiliated neighborhoods and villages, respectively (see Figure 51). District Three CAC is providing minimal coverage for some outlying villages included in the Tactical Assessment, including al-Fa'aori, al-Hamame, and Mish-mishan until their own CACs generate the capacity for governance.

Figure 52 depicts the governance architecture of the main Jisr al-Shugour CAC, including names of

current occupants. The CAC is headed by an Executive Council and contains functional committees with subordinate staff. The individuals occupying these positions were elected to their positions and demonstrate the optic needed to encourage defection to an alternative, rule-of-law based political structure for all.

Figure 53 illustrates the command structure of the armed Syrian opposition units operating in Jisr al-Shugour. The link analysis of these units can be ex-





Figure 53. Link chart of the armed Syrian opposition units operating in Jisr al-Shugour.

panded upon to demonstrate the operational linkages and areas of influence. Figure 53 also illustrates that Ahrar al-Sham's Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion's detachment from the other SMC-affiliated units presents a potential political challenge if its resources give it greater capacity than the moderate units.

Since all armed Syrian opposition units have low influence with Idlib's population at this point, building up the capacity of the moderate units could provide immediate support to an already viable CAC structure and create a key strategic communications image.

AD DANA VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Representative**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Nominally**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Red	Council	Green	Red	Red	Yellow

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Idlib Military Council			+	Secular		High	Regional
15 Adhar Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Local
al-Shuhada Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Local
Dir al-Jazeera Brigade		+	+	Nominally		Low	Local
Haramain Company		+	+	Nominally		Low	Local
Shuhada Kafr Rooma Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Local
Ahrar Al-Mawaly Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Fursan al-Haq Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Hamza Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Fajrul-Islam Battalion		+	+	Devout		Low	Local
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ahmad Abu Issa	-	+	Devout		High	National
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Tawhid wa Iman Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
al Shima Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
al Farqan Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Sariyah al-Jebel Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Internet	Yellow	Green	Green	Green

Linking Ad Dana to the SOC:

Ad Dana's location places it at the extreme end of the Idlib Opposition logistics chain, but it serves as a primary logistics hub for the southern Idlib governorate villages. It enjoys good regional communications infrastructure and access to the internet, but it does not yet have a relationship with the SOC.


Based on the current location of fundamentalist and extremist armed opposition units, coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Idlib Military Council
- 3) Area Nominally Religious Units

Immediate SOC assistance to Ad Dana should focus on food, cooking fuel, and medicine. Secondary priority should be placed on educational material and building the capacity of the CAC to provide a structured curriculum, teacher salaries, and some primary medical care.

There is a strong devout Muslim and fundamentalist unit presence in this village, which could begin to radicalize the youth in the absence of a moderate educational structure.


Tertiary requirements for Ad Dana are infrastructure repair on the electrical system and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops. While support for crops will be difficult under current security conditions, it is important to begin the discussions on needs now for when the transportation lines become passable. Furthermore, Ad Dana's judicial council needs to be incorporated into the nascent



formal legal system being established throughout liberated Idlib.

Resource support to Ad Dana will likely take up to 8 days, so CAC communication with the SOC via Skype or similar communication system should occur on day 6.

ADHAR VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Representative**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Green	Red	Green	Red	Green	Red

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Azzar Battalion		+	-	Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Janoudieh Hawks Battalion		-	-	Observant	Moderate	Low	Local
Janoudieh Martyrs Brigade		-	-	Observant	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Ansar al-Sham		-	-	Fundamentalist	Low	Low	Regional

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Red	Green	Green	Word of Mouth	Yellow	Grid Destroyed	Yellow	Red

Linking Adhar to the SOC:

Adhar's location along the Turkish border in liberated territory places it close to the Idlib Opposition logistics chain. Nevertheless, it suffers from extreme deprivation in terms of basic needs and communications. Its CAC suffers from low popularity due to lack of resources, and it has no relationship with the SOC. While Adhar's population is generally observant, failing to meet its basic needs quickly could result in radicalization.


Adhar can best be resourced by using the Khirbet al-Joz hub. Of the four armed opposition units in the village, only one is openly subordinate to the CAC. It is recommended that coordination for resource delivery be made through :

- 1) Dar al-Haq (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 2) Shakour al-Sham (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 3) Azzar Battalion

However, resources should be made available to the Janoudieh Hawks Battalion and the Janoudieh Martyrs Brigade, particularly if they agree to subordinate their activities to the CAC.

Immediate SOC assistance to Adhar should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communications equipment. Adhar is effectively cut off from the rest of the region and its CAC will not be effective without the ability to receive and transmit information.


Secondary priority should be placed on educational material and building the capacity of the CAC to provide a structured curriculum, teacher salaries, and some primary medical care.



Tertiary requirements for Adhar are infrastructure repair on the electrical system and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.

Resource support to Adhar will likely take up to 6 days, so CAC communication with the SOC via Skype or similar communication system should occur on day 4. Alternatively, due to its location along the border, village CAC members could meet with resource providers in Turkey and return with a substantial supply of basic needs material.

AL-BISHIRIYA VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●				●		

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion	Mahmoud al-Kanash	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Tahrir Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade							
Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Linking al-Bishiriya to the SOC:

Al-Bishiriya is located close to two other liberated villages along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It has no functioning CAC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Al-Bishiriya is currently in a tenuous logistics position given Jisr al-Shugour to its northwest is still contested by the regime. It has no relationship with the SOC.


There are no known units based out of al-Bishiriya at this time. Local units are fighting for Jisr al-Shugour, but show strong support for both CACs and the SMC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using Khirbet al-Joz and Broma nodes. With this route, coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Dar al-Haq (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 2) Shakour al-Sham (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 3) Abnaa Aisha Battalion
- 4) Al-Amir Hamad Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Bishiriya should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. While there is private media capability in the area, it is not connected to a larger information network.

Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, educational material and a structured curriculum should be offered along with teacher salaries and some primary medical care.


Tertiary requirements for Al-Bishiriya are infrastructure, emergency electrical generators, and, as pos-



sible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops. While support for crops will be difficult under current security conditions, it is important to begin the discussions on needs now for when the transportation lines become passable.

Resource support to Al-Bishiriya will likely take up to 8 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables in coordination with moderate units possessing communication capability. Communication should occur on day 6 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

AL-FA'AORI VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Free Syrian Army		-	+	Secular	Moderate	Moderate	Regional
Darkoush Local Battalion		+	-	Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Lewa Samih (Kataib)		-	-	Devout	Low	Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Hussein Battalion			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Linking al-Fa'aori to the SOC:

Al-Fa'aori is located southeast of regime-held Qarmide and to the west of the central cultivated valley. It has no functioning CAC, no relationship with the SOC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Al-Fa'aori is currently in a tenuous logistics position given its position on the far end of Qarmide, though it is integrated into the Jisr al-Shugour CAC District Three structure.


There are no known units based out of al-Fa'aori at this time, though the nearest units are in Darkoush and some are moderate. One unit is subordinate to the SMC, the local Free Syrian Army unit, but the Darkoush Local Battalion is subordinate to the CAC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Darkoush hub in coordination with:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion (Darkoush)

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Fa'aori should focus on water, food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, blankets, mattresses, and educational material with a structured curriculum should be offered. Al-Fa'aori's infrastructure is devastated, necessitating emergency electrical generators, road repair, and fuel for automobiles. Although al-Fa'aori's crops suffer from inadequate inputs, meeting the village's basic needs must take priority.

Resource support to Al-Fa'aori will likely take up to 7 days. Until a CAC can be established, communica-



tion with the SOC should be through local notables in coordination with the Free Syrian Army. Communication should occur on day 5 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

AL-FARIKEH VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion	Mahmoud al-Kanash	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Tahrir Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade							
Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Word of Mouth				

Linking al-Farikh to the SOC:

Al-Farikh is located close to two other liberated villages along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It has no functioning CAC, no relationship with the SOC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Al-Farikh is currently in a tenuous logistics position given Jisr al-Shugour to its northwest is still contested by the regime.


There are no known units based out of al-Farikh at this time. Local units are fighting for Jisr al-Shugour, but show strong support for both CACs and the SMC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using Khirbet al-Joz and Bromia nodes. With this route, coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Dar al-Haq (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 2) Shakour al-Sham (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 3) Abnaa Aisha Battalion
- 4) Al-Amir Hamad Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Farikh should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach.

Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, blankets, mattresses, and educational material with a structured curriculum should be offered along with some primary medical care.


Tertiary requirements for Al-Farikh are infrastructure, emergency electrical generators, and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops. While support for crops will be difficult under current secu-



ity conditions, it is important to begin the discussions on needs now for when the transportation lines become passable.

Resource support to Al-Farikh will likely take up to 8 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables in coordination with moderate units possessing communication capability. Communication should occur on day 6 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

AL-HAMAME VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Free Syrian Army		-	+	Secular	Moderate	Moderate	Regional
Darkoush Local Battalion		+	-	Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Lewa Samih (Kataib)		-	-	Devout	Low	Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Linking al-Hamame to the SOC:

Al-Hamame is located west of regime-held Qarmide, has no functioning CAC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Al-Hamame's location along the Turkish border gives it access to resources, and it is integrated into the Jisr al-Shugour CAC District Three structure for minimal governance support. It has no relationship with the SOC.


There are no known units based out of al-Hamame at this time, though the nearest units are in Darkoush and some are moderate. One unit is subordinate to the SMC, the local Free Syrian Army unit, but the Darkoush Local Battalion is subordinate to the CAC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Darkoush hub in coordination with:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion (Darkoush)

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Hamame should focus on water, food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. While there is private media capability in the area, it is not connected to a larger information network.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, mattresses, and educational material with a structured curriculum should be offered. Al-Hamame's infrastructure is devastated, necessitating emergency electrical generators and road repair. Although al-Hamame's crops suffer from inadequate inputs, meeting the village's basic needs must take priority.

Resource support to Al-Hamame will likely take up



to 5 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through the Jisr al-Shugour District Three CAC or through local notables in coordination with Shakour al-Sham. Communication should occur on day 3 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

AL-JANOUDIEH VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●				●		

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Azzar Battalion		+	-	Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Janoudieh Hawks Battalion		-	-	Observant	Moderate	Low	Local
Janoudieh Martyrs Brigade		-	-	Observant	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Ansar al-Sham		-	-	Fundamentalist	Low	Low	Regional

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only		Grid Destroyed		

Linking al-Janoudieh to the SOC:

Al-Janoudieh is located west of regime-held Qarmide, has no functioning CAC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Al-Janoudieh's location approximately 10 kilometers from the Turkish border gives it access to resources, but it has no relationship with the SOC and is consistently short of supplies due to lack of coordination.


There are no known units based out of al-Janoudieh at this time, but the units based out of Adhar to the northwest are oriented toward the village. Of the four armed opposition units, only one is openly subordinate to the CAC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the al-Qunieh node in coordination with:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion (Darkoush)
- 3) Azzar Battalion

However, resources should be made available to the Janoudieh Hawks Battalion and the Janoudieh Martyrs Brigade, particularly if they agree to subordinate their activities to the CAC.

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Janoudieh should focus on heating fuel, food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. Al-Janoudieh's communication capacity is restricted to the local area meaning it cannot transmit its needs to the SOC or other resource providers.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, mattresses, and educational material



with a structured curriculum should be offered. Al-Janoudieh's infrastructure is serviceable with roads being generally passable, but the electrical grid is destroyed. Although al-Janoudieh's crops suffer from inadequate inputs, meeting the village's basic needs must take priority.

Resource support to Al-Janoudieh will likely take up to 6 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables in coordination with Azzar Battalion. Communication should occur on day 4 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

AL-QUNIEH, JDIEDAH, & YAQOUBIEH VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Representative**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●			●	●		

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Red	Green	Council	Green	Red	Red	Green

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Khirbet al Joz Battalion		+	-	Observant	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		+	-	Fundamentalist	Moderate	Low	Regional
Jabhat al-Nusra		-	-	Extremist	Low	Moderate	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green	Grid Destroyed	Green	Green

Linking al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh to the SOC:


Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh are located west of regime-held Qarmide; have a highly popular, functioning, but poorly resourced CAC; and have no communication capacity at all. These Christian villages are located approximately 5 kilometers from the Turkish border and have access to resources, but they have no relationship with the SOC.

There are three units based out of al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh, but two of the three are Salafist. Only the Khirbet al-Joz Battalion is considered moderate, and it enjoys a good level of influence and popularity due to its local focus. These Christian villages have established excellent relationships with the Khirbet al-Joz Battalion, which does not approach them without prior notification. Both it and the area Ahrar al-Sham Brigade are willing to subordinate their activities to the CAC. It is recommended that coordination for resource delivery be made through:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Khirbet al-Joz Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh should focus on food, blankets, and communication equipment with a regional reach. Despite being relatively secure on most basic needs, al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh's are hosting thousands of Sunni refugees and require humanitarian assistance support.

Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh's infrastructure is in relatively good condition, but the electrical grid is destroyed. Al-Qunieh,




Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh's crops appear to be healthy at this time.

Resource support to Al-Qunieh, Jdiedah, and Yaqoubieh will likely take up to 4 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables in coordination with the Khirbet al-Joz Battalion. Communication should occur on day 2 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

These Christian villages provide the most important strategic communications optic in Idlib and could inspire further defection by they example.



ARIHAH VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication & Supplies

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Council				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Suqour al-Sham Brigade		-	+	Devout		High	National
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Abad al Rahman Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
											Grid Damaged		

Linking Arihah to the SOC:

Arihah is located south of Idlib City along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It has a popular, functioning CAC with regional communication capacity. Arihah is already communicating with the SOC and has been able to receive some supplies on its behalf.


Though a moderately religious community, the armed Syrian opposition units operating in the village have a very conservative Sunni character. This situation threatens radicalization unless moderate forces can be empowered.

Of the three units fighting in Arihah, none are subordinate to the CAC, but one does subordinate its activities to the SMC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Saraqeb hub. With this route, coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Suqour al-Sham Brigade

Immediate SOC assistance to Arihah should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and educational material with a structured curriculum. The educational resources will be a critical component to avoiding the radicalization of youth in this village.


As Arihah is host to thousands of area refugees, secondary priority should be placed on refugee assistance, such as blankets, mattresses, and heating fuel. Tertiary requirements for Arihah are infrastructure repair, automobile fuel, and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops. While support for crops will be difficult under current security conditions, it is important to begin the discussions



on needs now for when the transportation lines become passable.

Resource support to Arihah will likely take up to 5 days. Communication should occur on day 3 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

ARMANAZ VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Observant**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
None in immediate area							


None in immediate area

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	White	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Local Only	Yellow	Grid Damaged	Green	Yellow

Linking Armanaz to the SOC:

Armanaz is located northwest of Idlib City in liberated territory, has no functioning CAC, no relationship with the SOC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Armanaz's location near the Turkish border gives it access to resources, but it still faces deprivation due to lack of communication capacity.



There are no known units based out of Armanaz at this time, though fundamentalist units traverse it to fight in Idlib City. Without a moderate armed Syrian opposition unit in the vicinity, it will be difficult to ensure delivery of resources without inadvertently supporting Salafist units. Providing resources to this village will likely have to be coordinated with a regionally-oriented opposition unit until a local police force can be established to ensure the safety of supplies. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using Harim hub in coordination with:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion (Darkoush)

Immediate SOC assistance to Armanaz should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. While there is private media capability in the area, it is not connected to a larger information network. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters passing through the territory.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, and mattresses are needed. Armanaz's infrastructure is basically intact, but it requires

electrical grid repair and its crops require inputs to improve yield.

Resource support to Armanaz will likely take up to 6 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables. Communication should occur on day 4 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

BASSAMIS VILLAGE

ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Devout**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity


Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Idlib Military Council	Afeef Mahmoud Suleiman			Secular		High	Regional
Saif al-Haq Battalion			+	Secular		High	Regional
Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Battalion	Jamal Maarouf			Nominally		High	Regional
Fajrul-Islam Battalion		+	+	Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Battalions	Ali Moayad Bakran	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas le-Hraer Suriyah Battalion	Imad Muhamed Laeed	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Baba Amr Battalion	Ahmad Bakran	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Shehada Suriyah Battalion	Jihad Hamadi Jazar	-		Devout		Low	Local
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ahmad Abu Issa	-	+	Devout		High	National
Abu Al-fadl al Abaas Battalion	Zakarya Abu Yahya		+	Devout		High	National
Al-Khansa Battalion	Ali Abu Shayma		+	Devout		High	National
Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar Battalion	Assad Abu Musab		+	Devout		High	National
Ansar al-Haq Battalion	Rashid Abu Abdo		+	Devout		High	National
Daoud Battalion	Hassan Aboud Abu Abdu		+	Devout		High	National
Muhamad al-Khalif Battalion	Muhamad Khalaf		+	Devout		High	National
Ze Qar Battalion	Abdel Aziz Abu Saam		+	Devout		High	National
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Suriyah al-Jebel Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Linking Bassamis to the SOC:

Bassamis's location places it at the extreme end of the Idlib Opposition logistics chain, it has no CAC, no relationship with the SOC, and it only has local private communication capacity. The Bassamis population is generally devout, and the majority of the area units are similarly religious.



Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Ad Dana hub in coordination with:

- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Idlib Military Council
- 3) Saif al-Haq Battalion
- 4) Jebal al_Zawiya Martyrs Battalion

Resource support to Bassamis will likely take up to 9 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through local notables with the assistance of area moderate units. Communication should occur on day 7 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

Immediate SOC assistance to Bassamis should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. While there is private media capability in the area, it is not connected to a larger information network.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, blankets, and mattresses are needed.

Tertiary requirements for Bassamis are infrastructure repair on the electrical system and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only		Grid Damaged		

BDAMA VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●				●		

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
FSA Brigade 111		+		Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Regional
Hamsa al-Khateeb		-		Devout	Low	Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham		-	-	Fundamentalist	Low	Moderate	Regional

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel

Linking Bdama to the SOC:

Bdama is located west of Jisr al-Shugour along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It has a popular, functioning CAC with national communication capacity. Bdama has some minimal communication with the SOC and is next to the Broma communication logistics node.


Though a moderately religious community, the armed Syrian opposition units operating in the village have a more conservative Sunni character. This situation threatens radicalization unless moderate forces can be empowered.

Of the three units fighting in Bdama, none are subordinate to the SMC, but one does subordinate its activities to the CAC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Khirbet al-Joz and Broma nodes. With this route, coordination with the following units is recommended:


- 1) Dar al-Haq (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 2) Shakour al-Sham (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 3) FSA Brigade 111

Immediate SOC assistance to Bdama should focus on food, cooking fuel, heating fuel, blankets, and mattresses. Secondary requirements for Bdama are emergency electrical generators, infrastructure repair, automobile fuel, and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.

Resource support to Bdama will likely take up to 4 days. Communication should occur on day 2 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.



BELIOUN VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●			●			

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Formal Legal				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Idlib Military Council	Afeef Mahmoud Suleiman		+	Secular		High	Regional
Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Battalion	Jamal Maarouf			Nominally		High	Regional
Fajrul-Islam Battalion		+	+	Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Battalions	Ali Moayad Bakran	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas le-Hraer Suriyah Battalion	Imad Muhamed Laeed	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Baba Amr Battalion	Ahmad Bakran	-		Devout		Low	Local
Qisas Shehada Suriyah Battalion	Jihad Hamadi Jazar	-		Devout		Low	Local
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ahmad Abu Issa	-	+	Devout		High	National
Abu Al-fadl al Abaas Battalion	Zakarya Abu Yahya		+	Devout		High	National
Al-Khansa Battalion	Ali Abu Shayma		+	Devout		High	National
Al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar Battalion	Assad Abu Musab		+	Devout		High	National
Al-Sheed Muhamad al-Abdullah Battalion	Nidal al Haj Ali		+	Devout		High	National
Ansar al-Haq Battalion	Rashid Abu Abdo		+	Devout		High	National
Daoud Battalion	Hassan Aboud Abu Abdu		+	Devout		High	National
Muhamad al-Khalif Battalion	Muhamad Khalaf		+	Devout		High	National
Ze Qar Battalion	Abdel Aziz Abu Saam		+	Devout		High	National
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Sariyah al-Jebel Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Linking Beliou to the SOC:

Beliou's location places it at the extreme end of the Idlib Opposition logistics chain, it has a nascent CAC, has some minimal communication with the SOC through third parties, but has no communication capacity. The Beliou population is generally nominally religious, though the majority of the area units are devout.


Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Ad Dana hub in coordination with:

- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Idlib Military Council
- 3) Jebal al_Zawiya Martyrs Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Beliou should focus on water, food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. Secondary priority should be placed on enhancing the capacity of the CAC and providing education ma-

terials. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, blankets, and mattresses are needed. Tertiary requirements for Beliou are infrastructure repair on the electrical system and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.

Resource support to Beliou will likely take up to 9 days. Communication should occur on day 7 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.




Opposition Fighting Units (Continued)

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Jebal al-Zawiya Martyrs Brigade							
Ibrahim Hananu Brigade							
Ammar Bin Yasir Company							
Beuna Taala Battalion							

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow

DARKOUSH VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●			●			

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Informal Legal				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Free Syrian Army		-	+	Secular	Moderate	Moderate	Regional
Darkoush Local Battalion		+	-	Nominally	Moderate	Moderate	Local
Lewa Samih (Kataib)		-	-	Devout	Low	Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Hussein Battalion			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
											Grid Damaged		

Linking Darkoush to the SOC:

Darkoush is located north of regime-held Qarmide; has a highly popular, functioning, CAC; and serves as a primary logistics hub. Nevertheless, it only has some minimal communication with the SOC.


There are five units based out of Darkoush, two of which are moderate and another two are Salafist. It is recommended that coordination for resource delivery be made through :

- 1) The Free Syrian Army
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion


Immediate SOC assistance to Darkoush should focus on water, food, cooking fuel, blankets, and heating fuel.

Secondary priority should be placed on enhancing the CAC's medical services for the village. Darkoush's infrastructure is in relatively good condition, but the electrical grid is damaged. Darkoush's crops appear to be healthy at this time.

Resource support to Darkoush will likely take up to 3 days. Communication should occur on day 1 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.



HARIM VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Council				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
None in immediate area							

None in immediate area

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
											Grid Damaged		

Linking Harim to the SOC:


Harim is located north of Idlib City in liberated territory; has a popular, functioning CAC; has minimal communication with the SOC, and it has regional communication capacity with internet. Harim's location along the Turkish border gives it access to resources, and it serves as a logistics hub for area villages. Its basic needs profile indicates it can become a stable village with some coordinated support.

There are no known armed opposition units based out of Harim at this time, though fundamentalist units traverse it to fight in Idlib City. Without a moderate armed Syrian opposition unit in the vicinity, it will be difficult to ensure delivery of resources without inadvertently supporting Salafist units. Providing resources to this village will likely have to be coordinated with a regionally-oriented opposition unit until a local police force can be established to ensure the safety of supplies.


Immediate SOC assistance to Harim should focus on food, cooking fuel, and medicine. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters passing through the territory.

Secondary priority should be placed on automobile fuel, heating fuel, and emergency shelter. Harim's infrastructure is basically intact, but it requires electrical grid repair and its crops require inputs to improve yield.

Resource support to Harim will likely take up to 4 days. Communication between the CAC and SOC should occur on day 2 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.



IDLIB CITY ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Representative**

Control Status: **Contested**

SOC Resources: **Communication Only**

Religiosity: **Nominally**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●	●		●	●		

CAC Governance Capacity


Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
		Formal Legal				

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Idlib Military Council	Afeef Mahmoud Suleiman	+	+	Secular		High	Regional
Sout al-Haq Battalion	Hussein Mohammed		+	Secular		High	Regional
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib				Secular		Low	Regional
Mahir Hammoush Battalion		+	+	Secular		Low	Regional
Hurras al-Thawra al-Suriya Company			+	Secular		Low	Regional
Shouber Ibrahim Company			+	Secular		Low	Regional
Furqan Battalion			+	Nominally		High	National
Al-Shemah Company			+	Nominally		High	National
Ahwaz Company			+	Nominally		High	National
Sons of Walid Battalion	Naqeeb Mohammed al-Sheikh	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Al Orabi Martyr's Company	Samaq Addour	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Abdel Rouf al-Muwazin Company	Ayad Issa	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Hamza Al-Khateeb Battalion	Abdul Satar Yunsu	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Dhi Qar Company			+	Devout		Low	Local
Dhi Qar Battalion	Ali Abdullah Sbeyh	-	+	Devout		Low	Regional
Farouq Regiment in the North		+	+	Devout		Low	Regional
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Green Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Linking Idlib City to the SOC:

Idlib City is the capital of Idlib Governorate and an important political symbol at the operational level. It is currently contested by the Assad regime with many Sunnis taking refuge in Christian villages. It has a functioning, highly popular CAC, and very good infrastructure and access to resources.




Because regime forces still control parts of the city, access to resources are greater here than in other fully liberated villages, and delivering resources to Idlib City in the name of the SOC is virtually impossible. However, planning should commence with the CAC for delivery of essential resources once it is liberated.

Idlib City requires infant milk, and humanitarian essentials, such as temporary shelter, blankets, and mattresses. Idlib City has access to national media and a robust information architecture. Like most areas, its crops are suffering from poor inputs and disrupted cultivation.

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

KAFR AWAIID VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: None

Religiosity: Observant

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Red	Council	Red	Red	Red	Red

Opposition Fighting Units


UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Suqour al-Sham Brigade	Ahmad Abu Issa	-	+	Devout		High	National
Al-Sheed Muhamad al-Abdullah Battalion	Nidal al Haj Ali		+	Devout		High	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Local Only	Yellow	Grid Damaged	Green	Yellow

Linking Kafr Awaid to the SOC:

Kafr Awaid's location places it at the extreme end of the Idlib Opposition logistics chain, it has a nascent CAC, has no communication with the SOC, and has only local private communication capacity. The Kafr Awaid population is generally religiously observant, but the units operating out of the village are devout and enjoy a high degree of influence with the population.



Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Ad Dana hub in coordination with:


- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Idlib Military Council (Ad Dana)
- 3) Shakour al-Sham Brigade
- 4) Al-Sheed Muhamad al-Abdullah Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Kafr Awaid should focus on food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach. While there is private media capability in the area, it is not connected to a larger information network.

Secondary priority should be placed on enhancing the capacity of the CAC and providing education materials. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel, blankets, and mattresses are needed. Tertiary requirements for Kafr Awaid are infrastructure repair on the electrical system and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.

Resource support to Kafr Awaid will likely take up to 9 days. Communication should occur on day 7 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

KHIRBIT AL-JOZ VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Observant

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Red	Green	Red	Red	Red	Green

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Dar al-Haq		-	-	Devout	Moderate	Low	Local
Shakour al-Sham		-	+	Devout	Moderate	High	Regional

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Light Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow

Linking Khirbet al-Joz to the SOC:

Khirbet al-Joz is located northwest of Jisr al-Shugour along the Turkish border. It has a nascent CAC, regional communication capacity, and some minimal communication with the SOC. Khirbet al-Joz serves as a logistics node for western Idlib.


Though a moderately religious community, the armed Syrian opposition units operating in the village have a more devout Sunni character. Of the two units fighting in Khirbet al-Joz, one is subordinate to the SMC, Shakour al-Sham. Coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Shakour al-Sham
- 2) Dar al-Haq


Immediate SOC assistance to Khirbet al-Joz should focus on food, cooking fuel, heating fuel, and blankets. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the environment. Khirbet al-Joz has good regional communication and access to the internet.

Secondary priority should be placed on enhancing the capacity of the CAC for governance. Additionally, automobile fuel, heating fuel is needed. Khirbet al-Joz's infrastructure is in good overall condition.

Resource support to Khirbet al-Joz will likely take up to 3 days. Communication should occur on day 1 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.



MA'ARAT MISRIN TOWN ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Nominally**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Jabir bin Abdullah Battalion			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Demna al Outab Company			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Jabir bin Abdullah Battalion			-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
											Grid Damaged		

Linking **Ma'arat Misrin** to the SOC:

Ma'arat Misrin is located approximately 8 kilometers northeast of Idlib City in liberated territory; has no CAC; has no communication with the SOC, but has national communication capacity and access to private media production. Ma'arat Misrin's location on the outskirts of Idlib City give it minimal access to resources.


Though a moderately religious community, the armed Syrian opposition units operating in the village are fundamentalist, which threatens radicalization unless moderate forces can be introduced.

Without a moderate armed Syrian opposition unit in the vicinity, it will be difficult to ensure delivery of resources without inadvertently supporting Salafist units. Providing resources to this village will likely have to be coordinated with a regionally-oriented opposition unit until a local police force can be established to ensure the safety of supplies. Ma'arat Misrin can best be resourced by using the Bab al-Hawa hub.

Immediate SOC assistance to Ma'arat Misrin should focus on food, cooking fuel, and medicine. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters operating from the village.

Secondary priority should be placed on automobile fuel, heating fuel, blankets, and mattresses. Ma'arat Misrin's infrastructure is in good condition, but it requires electrical grid repair.


Resource support to Ma'arat Misrin will likely take up to 6 days. Until a CAC can be established, com-



munication with the SOC should be through local notables. Communication between the CAC and SOC should occur on day 4 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

MISHMISHAN VILLAGE

ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**

Control Status: **Liberated**

SOC Resources: **None**

Religiosity: **Devout**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion	Mahmoud al-Kanash	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Tahrir Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade							
Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Linking Mishmishan to the SOC:

Mishmishan is located close to two other liberated villages along the Latakia-Aleppo M4 highway. It has no functioning CAC, no relationship with the SOC, and it only has village area communication capacity. Mishmishan is currently in a tenuous logistics position given Jisr al-Shugour to its northwest is still contested by the regime.


There are no known units based out of Mishmishan at this time. Local units are fighting for Jisr al-Shugour, but show strong support for both CACs and the SMC. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using Khirbet al-Joz and Broma nodes. With this route, coordination with the following units is recommended:

- 1) Dar al-Haq (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 2) Shakour al-Sham (Khirbet al-Joz)
- 3) Abnaa Aisha Battalion
- 4) Al-Amir Hamad Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Mishmishan should focus on water, food, cooking fuel, medicine, and communication equipment with a regional reach.


Secondary priority should be placed on building a CAC for the village. Additionally, blankets, mattresses, and educational material with a structured curriculum should be offered along with some primary medical care.

Tertiary requirements for Mishmishan are infrastructure, emergency electrical generators, and, as possible, coordination on inputs for ailing crops.



Resource support to Mishmishan will likely take up to 8 days. Until a CAC can be established, communication with the SOC should be through the Jisr al-Shugour District Three CAC or through local notables in coordination with area moderate armed opposition units. Communication should occur on day 6 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

SALQIN VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Nominally

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Red	Council	Green	Red	Green	Yellow

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
None in immediate area							

None in immediate area

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow

Linking Salqin to the SOC:


Salqin is located northwest of Idlib City in liberated territory; has a moderately popular, functioning CAC; has some minimal communication with the SOC, and it has some regional communication capacity. Salqin's location along the Turkish border gives it access to resources, but it is deficient in many basic needs.

There are no known units based out of Armanaz at this time, though fundamentalist units traverse it to fight in Idlib City. Without a moderate armed Syrian opposition unit in the vicinity, it will be difficult to ensure delivery of resources without inadvertently supporting Salafist units. Providing resources to this village will likely have to be coordinated with a regionally-oriented opposition unit until a local police force can be established to ensure the safety of supplies. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using Harim hub in coordination with:

- 1) The Free Syrian Army (Darkoush)
- 2) Darkoush Local Battalion (Darkoush)


Immediate SOC assistance to Salqin should focus on food, infant milk, cooking fuel, and medicine. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters passing through the territory.

Secondary priority should be placed on blankets, mattresses, automobile fuel, and building the medical and educational capacity of the CAC. Salqin requires electrical and roads are in relatively good condition, but its crops require inputs to improve yield.



Resource support to Salqin will likely take up to 5 days. Communication between the CAC and SOC should occur on day 3 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

SARMADA VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Observant

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Green	Red	Green	Red	Green	Yellow

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
None in immediate area							

None in immediate area

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communi-cations	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Red	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Light Green	Yellow	Grid Damaged	Orange	Yellow

Linking Sarmada to the SOC:


Sarmada is located north of Idlib City in liberated territory; has a moderately popular, functioning CAC; has minimal communication with the SOC, and it has regional communication capacity with internet. Sarmada's location along the Turkish border and main road gives it access to resources, but it is deficient in many basic needs.

There are no known armed opposition units based out of Sarmada at this time, though fundamentalist units traverse it to fight in Idlib City. Without a moderate armed Syrian opposition unit in the vicinity, it will be difficult to ensure delivery of resources without inadvertently supporting Salafist units. Providing resources to this village will likely have to be coordinated with a regionally-oriented opposition unit until a local police force can be established to ensure the safety of supplies. Sarmada can best be resourced by using the Bab al-Hawa hub.

Immediate SOC assistance to Sarmada should focus on food, cooking fuel, and medicine. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicalization of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters passing through the territory.


Secondary priority should be placed on road repair, automobile fuel, heating fuel, and building the judicial and educational capacity of the CAC. Sarmada requires electrical grid repair, and its crops require inputs to improve yield.

Resource support to Sarmada will likely take up to 4 days. Communication between the CAC and SOC should occur on day 2 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.



With some coordinated support, Sarmada could become an important regional center of stability and governance demonstration for area villages.

SARMIN VILLAGE ASSESSMENT



CAC Politics: Representative

Control Status: Liberated

SOC Resources: Communication Only

Religiosity: Observant

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

CAC Governance Capacity


Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity
Green	Red	Council	Green	Red	Green	Yellow

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Idlib Military Council	Afeef Mahmoud Suleiman	+	+	Secular		High	Regional
Sout al-Haq Battalion	Hussein Mohammed		+	Secular		High	Regional
Special Tasks Battalion, Idlib				Secular		Low	Regional
Mahir Hammoush Battalion		+	+	Secular		Low	Regional
Hurras al-Thawra al-Suriya Company			+	Secular		Low	Regional
Shouber Ibrahim Company			+	Secular		Low	Regional
Furqan Battalion			+	Nominally		High	National
Al-Shemah Company			+	Nominally		High	National
Ahwaz Company			+	Nominally		High	National
Sons of Walid Battalion	Naqeeb Mohammed al-Sheikh	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Al Orabi Martyr's Company	Samaq Addour	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Abdel Rouf al-Muwazin Company	Ayad Issa	+	+	Nominally		Low	
Hamza Al-Khateeb Battalion	Abdul Satar Yunsu	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Dhi Qar Company			+	Devout		Low	Local
Dhi Qar Battalion	Ali Abdullah Sbeyh	-	+	Devout		Low	Regional
Farouq Regiment in the North		+	+	Devout		Low	Regional

Linking Sarmin to the SOC:

Sarmin is located approximately 8 kilometers southeast of Idlib City in liberated territory; has a functioning CAC; has minimal communication with the SOC, and has national communication capacity. Sarmin's location on the outskirts of Idlib City give it minimal access to resources and it is tied into the Saraqeb logistics hub.



Sarmin has a large number of armed opposition units operating in the immediate area, but there is a positive balance of moderate units there. Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Saraqeb hub in coordination with:

1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)

2) Idlib Military Council

3) Special Tasks Battalion

Immediate SOC assistance to Sarmin should focus on milk, food, cooking fuel, and medicine. Moreover, educational material with a structured curriculum is essential to this village to prevent the radicali-

Opposition Fighting Units

UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Janoud al-Haq Battalion		+	+	Devout		Moderate	Local
Bara 'ibn Malik Company		+	+	Devout		Moderate	Local
Al Mahajery Company		+	+	Devout		Moderate	Local
Al-Ansar Company		+	+	Devout		Moderate	Local
Dhi Qar Battalion	Ali Abdullah Sbeyh	-	+	Devout		Low	Regional
Farouq Regiment in the North		+	+	Devout		Low	Regional
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Green Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Janoud al-Haq Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National
Sufian Thawri Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
Yellow	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green	Green	Yellow

SARMIN VILLAGE ASSESSMENT


zation of youth given the prevalence of Salafist fighters passing through the territory.

Secondary priority should be placed on automobile fuel, heating fuel, and building up educational capacity of the CAC, and integrating its judicial council with the formal legal structure under development. Sarmin requires inputs to improve crop yield.

Resource support to Sarmin will likely take up to 6 days. Communication between the CAC and SOC should occur on day 4 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

Linking Shahbisho to the SOC:

Shahbisho's location places it at the extreme end of the Idlib Opposition logistics chain, and it has a nascent CAC. The Shahbisho population is generally religiously observant, but the units operating out of the village are devout and enjoy a high degree of influence with the population.



Based on current unit locations, this village can best be resourced by using the Ad Dana hub in coordination with:

- 1) Furqan Battalion (Saraqeb)
- 2) Idlib Military Council (Ad Dana)
- 3) Shakour al-Sham Brigade
- 4) Al-Sheed Muhamad al-Abdullah Battalion

A full assessment of Shahbisho's basic needs and humanitarian assistance requirements is unavailable at this time.

Resource support to Shahbisho will likely take up to 10 days. Communication should occur on day 8 after delivery commences to generate the appearance of immediate response from the SOC.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed for this study conscientiously adopts a qualitative approach to data gathering, but focuses on capturing local level information using sources with deep knowledge of their localities. The study records, geo-spatially renders, and analyzes information obtained by primary source, human networks operating inside Syria. Data gathering at the local level offers the greatest likelihood of accuracy given the constraints of the environment while allowing for assessment at higher levels of abstraction. The study achieves its regional and operational perspectives by aggregating the local analyses.

Traditional social science methods cannot be applied in this active conflict zone due to the Assad regime's monitoring of and control over the country's communication architecture and the disruption of normal civic interaction. True random sampling at the regional and national levels is, therefore, nearly impossible without extraordinary expense. Cognizant of these limitations, the study opts for quality of information and sourcing over statistically significant quantity.

The data contained in this study is the manifestation of the human network's experiences and relies on its access, placement, and reputation. The information presented is designed to provide the basis for further information gathering and planning. The authors thoroughly expect that independent analysis will deem the information and analysis credible, valid, and insightful despite being based on single source, primary data.

Information Source and Analytical Team

Data for this study was provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing humanitarian assistance and political good offices to Syrian civilian and armed opposition groups. The NGO that provided data has been operational in Syria since March 2011, has offices located

throughout the country, and communicates daily with both external and internal leaders and local activists. Moreover, it is recognized by the highest levels of the US Government as a key information source and provides regular updates to the Department of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the National Security Council, and other government agencies.

Data Capture and Analysis

This study endeavored to capture and geo-spatially depict the population-centric component of the Syrian civil war. Based on prior analysis, the authors of the study recognized the possibility of leveraging intrinsic Syrian cultural norms and civic practices to achieve US Government policy objectives. Unfortunately, data on these norms and practices are not part of standard reporting mechanisms to the US Government and are consequently unavailable for analysis. Moreover, decades of restricted US access in Syria meant limited means of data collection through standard channels.

The authors developed a relationship with NGOs and provided it with a series of SCA related phenomena thought relevant to policy makers. During **May and June 2013**, NGO's used their networks operating inside Idlib Governorate to fill out spreadsheets that serve as the basis of the analysis. The information in the spreadsheets was imported into Palantir to geo-spatially render and date stamp all data points. This capability allows for time series analysis as future studies are undertaken.

With each CAC, armed opposition unit, and village geo-located and date stamped, tactical assessments were made possible. The Palantir imports also created the baseline for social network analysis (SNA). Jisr al-Shugour was specifically augmented for demonstration purposes, but similar SNA data for the other CACs and armed opposition units is available as well. Aggregating the data and tactical

assessments allowed for operational and strategic assessment development.

Scale Assessments

Capturing socio-cultural reality in an active conflict zone requires modifying typical social science standards of collection. This study consciously attempts to achieve a reasonable balance of validity and reliability given the constraints of the environment. The methodology can be reliably replicated in other locations where an NGO network is active because the assessments are designed to be as simple, yet descriptive, as possible. The validity of the methodology is based on the access and placement the NGO network enjoys and the quality of relationships it maintains. We assess that the NGO network is very robust in Idlib Governorate and the data returned consequently benefits from high validity.

The definitions and scales adopted for this study are not meant to present normative conclusions about the merits of beliefs, *per se*. Rather, they seek to determine the impact on stated US Government policy and are thusly depicted by a generic green-to-red color scale. For instance, some might find Fundamentalists a normatively positive group, but it is difficult to assert that they create the conditions for a multi-sectarian government as stated in US Government policy. Definitions and scales for the assessments follow:

Religiosity

The authors opted for a series of definitions designed for the Syrian context rather than definitions applicable across societies. This is due to the reliance on Syrian internal networks that are not trained in standard social science research. The definitions reflect Syrian "common knowledge" of one another.

- 1) **Secular**—Defined as an individual or group that subordinates religion to civil government and authority. A secular is not necessarily non-religious, though this category would encompass such people, for instance communists.
- 2) **Nominally Religious**—Defined as an individual or group that professes affirmative affiliation

with a particular religion, but does not practice the religion strictly. People in this category believe that civil authority should supersede religious authority and believe that law should accommodate the diversity of religions of the population.

- 3) **Observant**—Defined as an individual or group that faithfully practices the tenets of a professed religion and believes that law should be informed by it. People in this category believe that civil law supersedes religious law, though they are less open to law being influenced by other religious or moral codes.
- 4) **Devout**—Defined as an individual or group for which religious practice is a central, daily pre-occupation. People in this category view their religion as coequal with morality, and while they believe in civil law, they also believe it should be the manifestation of religious doctrine.
- 5) **Fundamentalist**—Defined as an individual or group that believes in the literal interpretation of religious texts and believes that others are obligated to practice the religion in the same way. People in this category believe that religious law supersedes civil law and that a moral political order must be based on religious mandate.
- 6) **Extremist**—Defined as an individual or group that adopts an uncompromising interpretation of religion and that is willing to impose the interpretation on others by force if necessary. People in this group are typified by the term "Jihadi" and seek to re-establish a the Sunni caliphate.

Control Status

- 1) **Liberated**—A population center controlled by the Syrian opposition.
- 2) **Contested**—A population center partly controlled by both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime.
- 3) **Regime**—A population center controlled by the Assad regime.

CAC Governance Capacity

CAC Governance Capacity on Security, Medicine, Education, and Infrastructure is a simple **Yes** or **No** evaluation of whether the CAC is attempting to provide services in the sector. A "Yes" designation

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

does not mean that the CAC is effective providing the service, only that it seeks to provide the service. The Justice sector is a nominal five point scale defined as follows:

- 1) **Formal Legal**—Syria Free Lawyers and Free Judges operate in established courts according to Syrian civil law. Courts associated with the Formal Legal structure communicate with one another to create consistency of justice.
- 2) **Informal Legal**—Local lawyers, judges, and/or notables provide justice services according to Syrian civil law, but are not integrated into the Free Lawyers and Free Judges structure.
- 3) **Council**—Local notables provide justice services based on what they understand to be the precepts of civil and/or moral law are not integrated into the Free Lawyers and Free Judges structure.
- 4) **Shura**—Tribal leaders provide justice according to traditional codes of justice.
- 5) **Sharia Court**—Sunni religious figures establish courts based on their interpretations of Islamic law.

Cooking Fuel Security, Heating Fuel Security, Blankets, Mattresses, Shelter, Medicine, Milk, Education, and Crop Health

Basic Needs, humanitarian assistance, and farming inputs are in short supply across Syria. As a result, a relative deprivation approach to needs assessment was adopted for this study. A simple three point scale of **Adequate**, **Inadequate**, or **None** was used to assess needs. The scale is admittedly subjective, but relies on the expertise of professionals who deliver supplies to the villages and understand the relative expectations of the population. Consequently, the professionals are in the best position to identify where deprivation is greatest and most potentially explosive.

Food Security

The Food Security category is the only basic need that uses a four point scale due to its importance to both life and economics. Though a subsistence population might have enough to eat, it cannot contribute to the local economy or purchase other essentials if all income is devoted to satisfying food needs.

- 1) **Food Secure**—Individuals have sufficient daily caloric intake and relatively good access to a variety of typical foodstuffs.
- 2) **Above Subsistence**—Individuals have sufficient daily caloric intake, but typical foods are relatively scarce and only a small portion of disposable income can be used for purchases other than food.
- 3) **Subsistence**—Individuals achieve just enough calories per day to sustain life, but acquiring food is a constant struggle and monopolizes expenditures.
- 4) **Below Subsistence**—Individuals do not have sufficient caloric intake to sustain life without significant health consequences. Acquiring food is a daily struggle and consumes all available resources.

Water Quality

Water quality is assessed as either **Potable** or **Impotable**.

Infrastructure

Electricity, Auto Fuel, and Road conditions are all five point scales. The Communications assessment is a six point scale. All scales assume that national integration and access is positive condition and local capacity only is a negative condition.

Electricity

- 1) **Grid Power Working**—The population center is attached to a functioning power grid infrastructure and is receiving regular electrical service.
- 2) **Grid Power Damaged**—The population center is attached to a power grid, but damage to the system results in outages or lack of service.
- 3) **Grid Power Destroyed**—The population center is attached to a power grid, but lacks electrical service due to destroyed, but reparable equipment.
- 4) **Portable Generator Power**—The population center has no central power grid access due to severe damage or lack of infrastructure, but portable generators are available to the population.
- 5) **None**—The population center has no access to electrical power.

Auto Fuel

- 1) Fuel Distribution Working—The population center has a functioning fuel distribution system and is receiving regular supply.
- 2) Fuel Distribution Damaged—The population center has a functioning fuel distribution system, but damage to it results in lack of service or supply.
- 3) Fuel Distribution Destroyed—The population center has a fuel distribution system, but lacks supply due to destroyed, but reparable infrastructure.
- 4) Fuel Insufficient—The population center has barely enough fuel available to function.
- 5) None—The population center has no access to fuel.

Roads

- 1) Paved Passable—The population center has a paved road system and is fully intact.
- 2) Paved Damaged—The population center has a paved road system, but damage to the system, while reparable, results in delays and rerouting.
- 3) Paved Destroyed—The population center has a paved road system, but damage to the system requires extensive rerouting and repair.
- 4) Unpaved Passable—The population center has no paved road system, but the roads are fully navigable.
- 5) Unpaved Impassable—The population center has no paved road system and damaged to the roads—whether by conflict or weather—renders the roads unusable.

Communications

- 1) National Sufficient—The population center has access to telephone, television, radio, and/or internet with a national reach and without interruption.
- 2) National Insufficient—The population center has access to telephone, television, radio, and/or internet with a potentially national reach, but encounters frequent interruptions of service or cannot reach certain areas of the country.
- 3) Regional Sufficient—The population center has access to telephone, television, radio, and/or internet without interruption, but only regionally.
- 4) Regional Insufficient—The population center has access to telephone, television, radio, and/or internet, but only regionally and encounters

frequent interruptions of service or cannot reach certain parts of the region.

- 5) Local Only—The population center has access to telephone, television, and/or radio, but only locally.
- 6) None—The population center has no access to electronic communications.

Popularity

Popularity is measured by a simple three point scale, and is the subjective assessment of the network professionals working for SETF. A quantitative assessment was not possible given the operating conditions, so the three point scale offers at least an indication of popularity.

- 1) High Popularity—The individual or group is well respected by the community and is sought out for his or its service.
- 2) Moderate Popularity—The individual or group is assessed by the community to have both positive and negative attributes, but is generally accepted by it. Its reputation can easily rise or fall based on actions and attitudes.
- 3) Low Popularity—The individual or group is not respected due to its actions or inactions. It is assessed as providing little to no value to the community, and its presence is tolerated at best.

Influence Level

Influence is measured by a simple three point scale, and is the subjective assessment of the network professionals working for SETF. A quantitative assessment was not possible given the operating conditions, so the three point scale offers at least an indication of the degree to which an individual or group can encourage or compel citizens to conform to his/its preferences.

- 1) High Influence—The individual or group achieves widespread deference to or positive acceptance of his/its preferences, and citizens' behavior generally falls in accordance with them.
- 2) Moderate Influence—The individual or group achieves deference to or positive acceptance of his/its preferences among only a portion of the population, and only these pockets evince behavior in accordance with the preferences.
- 3) Low Influence—The individual or group achieves little to no deference to or positive

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

acceptance of his/its preferences, and citizens' behavior generally discounts the objectives sought by the entity.

Relationship with the SOC

The Relationship with the SOC assessment assumes per US Government policy that the SOC could fill the role of a transitional government or governance structure. Integrating the CACs with the SOC is, therefore, considered a positive outcome and lack of communication considered a negative condition.

- 1) **Transitional Governance**—The CAC regularly serves as the local arm of a national, integrated governance structure with the SOC at the center. The SOC provides resources and support to the CAC routinely and effectively.
- 2) **Governance Integrated**—The CAC coordinates its activities with the SOC to achieve a governance effect, but it does not serve as an extension of the SOC.
- 3) **Communication & Supplies**—The CAC is in regular contact with the SOC and the SOC provides supplies to it when possible.
- 4) **Communication Only**—The CAC has only periodic discussions with the SOC, but has no functional relationship with one another.
- 5) **None**—The CAC has no relationship with the SOC.

Subordinate to the CAC and Subordinate to the SMC

These assessments in part determine the willingness of armed Syrian opposition units to submit to civilian authority or a higher military authority with which the US Government is willing to work. Both are **Yes** or **No** scales.

Political Value

There is a diversity of thought on the type of political system Syria should have, especially among armed groups in Syria. A generic five point scale was adopted to try to capture orientation with the assumption that representative politics would most likely achieve a legitimate multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic polity and a caliphate would have the least chance.

- 1) **Representative**—Individuals or groups believe that the government structure should be led by

civilian leadership and whose right to govern is based on periodic, free, and fair elections.


- 2) **Kingdom**—Individuals or groups believe that the government structure should be led by a monarch with historic and culturally recognized right to rule.
- 3) **Authoritarian**—Individuals or groups believe that the government structure should be led an individual with strong executive powers due to the diversity of interests and the potential for political disintegration. Multiple political parties could potentially serve constituencies in this system and private ownership could be permissible.
- 4) **Totalitarian**—Individuals or groups believe that the government structure should be led by a strong central committee and single political party that directs all aspects of the country's politics and economics, and all property is that of the state.
- 5) **Caliphate**—Individuals or groups believe that the government structure should be led by a Caliph to restore the Sunni religio-political order that prevailed until the collapse of the Ottoman empire.

Political Orientation

Syrian political culture is for historical and current political reasons highly localized. Distrust of individuals or groups seeking to control the national government runs high. Because of this, this assessment adopts the perspective that legitimacy will be highest to Syrians the more the individual or group focuses on providing benefits at the local level and distrust will increase as their orientation moves to the regional and national levels. This is not to say that an individual or group with national orientation cannot be popular and legitimate. It only suggests that suspicion will grow the less the people have knowledge of or control over the entity. For this reason a simple three point scale of **Local**, **Regional**, and **National** is used.

APPENDIX B: TACTICAL

Stability Indicator
Quick View



AS-

CAC Politics: **Not Applicable**
 Control Status: **Liberated**
 SOC Resources: **None**
 Religiosity: **Devout**

Sunni	Alawite	Druze	Shiite	Christian	Kurd	Other
●						

Snapshot of sects and ethnicities represented in this population center

Overview of the population center's political & religious values and likely desire to work within a multi-sectarian, representative framework

CAC Governance Capacity

Security	Medicine	Justice	Food	Education	Infrastructure	Popularity

Snapshot of the governance sectors the CAC attempts to fulfill. A green indication does not mean the sector is successfully administered, only that the CAC attempts to do so

Opposition Fighting Units


UNIT	Leader	Subordinate to CAC	Subordinate to SMC	Religiosity	Popularity	Influence	Focus
Abnaa Aisha Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
al-Amir Hamad Battalion		+	+	Nominally		Low	Regional
Ahbab al-Mustafa Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Bilatu al-Shuhadaa Battalion	Mahmoud al-Kanash	+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Tahrir Battalion		+	+	Observant		Low	Local
Zaid bin Haritha Battalion		-	+	Devout		Low	Local
Ahrar al-Sham Brigade							
Ibn al-Mubarak Battalion		-	-	Fundamentalist		Low	National

Profiles of the armed Syrian opposition units operating in the vicinity of the population center. This table provides a quick evaluation of the willingness of each unit to submit to civilian or higher military authority, indicates whether the units can be leveraged for resource delivery, and provides indicators about the level of legitimacy of each unit.

Critical Area Needs

Food	Medicine	Milk	Cooking Fuel	Water	Blankets	Heating Fuel	Mattresses	Shelter	Communications	Education	Electricity	Roads	Auto Fuel
									Local Only				

Snapshot of the population's critical needs and, therefore, areas in which the SOC can become relevant to the population based on targeted, meaningful assistance



Map of the population center

Stability Indicator Quick View Government

	<p>A formal, legitimate government effectively provides security and basic essential services for the population and maintains sovereign control over its territory. Low threat of radicalization</p>	<p>A formal, but illegitimate, government provides some security and basic essential services based on patronage, and mostly maintains sovereign control over its territory. Moderate risk of radicalization.</p>	
High Legitimacy	<p>Local, informal, but legitimate, governance structures provide basic security and some essential services. Lack of resources and weak structures make stability tenuous. Moderate risk of radicalization.</p>	<p>Functional authority is held by armed groups, extremists, or criminal groups. Basic essential services and infrastructure are non-existent or tightly controlled by groups for domination. High risk of radicalization.</p>	No Legitimacy
	No Government		

APPENDIX C: US DEPARTMENT OF STATE SYRIA POLICY

U.S. Government Assistance to Syria

Fact Sheet

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC
June 19, 2013

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The United States supports the Syrian people's aspirations for a democratic, inclusive, and unified post-Assad Syria. The Assad regime, reinforced by Hezbollah and Iranian fighters, has turned the full force of its firepower against its own people in an effort to perpetuate its rule. The United Nations estimates that 93,000 Syrians have been killed since the unrest and violence began over two years ago. The number of Syrians seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased sharply as violence has escalated. More than 1.6 million Syrians are now registered as refugees or are awaiting registration in neighboring countries while, inside Syria, an additional 6.8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The United States is providing nearly \$815 million in humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the conflict. In addition, the United States has committed \$250 million in non-lethal transition support to the Syrian opposition. This assistance will help local opposition councils and civil society groups provide essential services to their communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of Syria. President Obama has also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The expansion of this assistance is aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the SMC to defend themselves against a repressive regime. Our efforts are also helping to coordinate the provision of assistance by the United States and other partners and allies.

Diplomatic Support

At the UK-chaired G-8 summit this week, President Obama and other world leaders called for: an end the conflict through the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué; the rejection of terrorism and sectarian extremism; access for the UN team assigned to investigate chemical weapons use in Syria; and access for aid agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need. U.S. diplomatic efforts seek to further isolate the regime, both politically and through comprehensive sanctions; support the Syrian people's calls for the end of Assad's rule; and reinforce the Syrian opposition's vision of a democratic post-Assad Syria – a unified nation that rejects extremism and guarantees the rights, interests, and participation of all Syrians regardless of their gender, religion, or ethnicity.

International efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria crisis have been based on the Geneva Communiqué agreed to by the United Nations Security Council permanent members and key regional and multilateral partners on June 30, 2012. It outlined a political solution to the Syrian conflict through the establishment of a transitional governing body, formed by mutual consent of the regime and the opposition, with full executive powers, including control over all government institutions.

This means the transitional governing body will have control over the military and intelligence services; police forces; government finances and assets; and the judiciary and prison system. The transitional governing body will be charged with establishing a national dialogue, reviewing the constitutional order and legal system, and preparing for and conducting free and fair multi-party elections. The Geneva Communiqué also calls for the continuity of governmental institutions and qualified staff and the preservation and restoration of public services.

Humanitarian Assistance

The United States, along with the international community, is working tirelessly to provide humanitarian aid to all civilians

affected by the brutal conflict in Syria and in the region. During the G-8 summit, President Obama announced over \$300 million in additional humanitarian assistance for the Syrian crisis, bringing total U.S. humanitarian assistance for those affected by the violence in Syria to nearly \$815 million. U.S. assistance is providing emergency medical care and medical supplies, childhood immunizations, food, clean water, and relief supplies to those affected by the crisis, as well supporting refugees and host communities in the neighboring countries.

Within Syria, U.S. humanitarian aid is reaching 3.2 million people in all 14 of the country's governorates on the basis of need and regardless of political affiliation. It is often not branded as U.S. assistance in order to ensure the safety of aid recipients and humanitarian aid providers as well as to guard against aid distribution being blocked while en route. The United States is committed to using all channels to reach affected populations throughout the country and is working through the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and community-based partners, as well as with the opposition's Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). The United States is also working closely with host governments in the region who have generously kept their borders open to refugees fleeing Syria. For more details on the U.S. humanitarian response to the Syria crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance is being provided, visit www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria.

Assistance to the Syrian Opposition

The United States is acting in partnership with the international community to assist the Syrian opposition as it works toward building a post-Assad Syria. The U.S. has committed to providing \$250 million in non-lethal transition assistance for the Syrian opposition.

This assistance supports the Syrian opposition's ability to both strengthen its operations and help local councils and communities in liberated areas procure and expand the delivery of basic goods and essential services. For example, in close collaboration with the opposition's ACU, additional non-lethal transition assistance is being provided to procure pre-identified equipment and supplies for prompt disbursement by the ACU to newly liberated communities. The United States is also delivering halal food rations and medical kits from U.S. government stocks to the Syrian opposition, including the SMC. In addition to expanding existing lines of support, the U.S. will consult with opposition groups and the SMC to determine their most urgent assistance needs.

President Obama has also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The expansion of this assistance is aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the SMC to defend themselves against a repressive regime. Our efforts are also helping to coordinate the provision of assistance by the United States and other partners and allies.

U.S. non-lethal assistance includes training and equipment to build the capacity of a network of ethnically and religiously diverse civilian activists to link Syrian citizens with the Syrian opposition and local coordinating councils. This support enhances the information security of Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and independent media outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active role in transition planning.

Through a series of small grants, the Syrian opposition is beginning to strengthen grass-roots administration – a foundation of democratic governance – as they provide basic services, including emergency power, sanitation, water and educational services. Some of this assistance is being directed to maintain public safety, extend the rule of law, and enhance the provision of justice to improve local stability and prevent sectarian violence.

Over 6,000 major pieces of equipment, including communications and computer equipment, as well as generators and medical supplies, have been provided to support civilian Syrian opposition groups, civil society activists, and citizen journalists.

Support to civil society groups and local councils includes efforts to train, equip, and build the capacity of nearly 1,500 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from over 100 opposition councils and organizations from around the country; **develop groups' abilities to mobilize citizens, share information, provide community services, and undertake civic functions;** support interreligious and communal dialogues and encourage citizen participation in shaping the Syrian transition; and support human rights documentation and transitional justice efforts while laying the foundation for future accountability efforts.

Support to independent media includes assistance to community radio stations providing information for refugees about available services; training for networks of citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their documentation,

APPENDIX D: US DEPARTMENT OF STATE SYRIA POLICY

packaging, and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and technical assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications security of Syrian activists within Syria.

Assistance in support of the democratic transition includes efforts to link civilian opposition elements inside Syria with global supporters; technical assistance to emerging civil society leaders; and facilitating participation by the business community in the transition processes.

Additional Support for the Syrian People

The United States has taken several steps to enable additional relief and reconstruction activities in Syria, particularly in opposition-controlled areas. To help Syrians begin to rebuild, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Statement of Licensing Policy inviting U.S. persons to apply to OFAC for specific licenses that would enable them to participate in certain economic activities in Syria. The OFAC statement focuses on applications by U.S. persons seeking to engage in oil-related transactions that benefit the Syrian Coalition, or its supporters, and transactions involving Syria's agricultural and telecommunications sectors. OFAC also amended Syria General License 11 to authorize the exportation of services and funds transfers in support of not-for-profit activities to preserve and protect cultural heritage sites in Syria. The OFAC general license is an authorization for those who meet its criteria; there is no need for an application.

In addition, pursuant to a new limited waiver of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, the Department of Commerce is authorized to process license applications for the export and re-export of certain commodities, software, and technology for the benefit of the Syrian people, including but not limited to those related to: water supply and sanitation; agricultural production and food processing; power generation; oil and gas production; construction and engineering; transportation; and educational infrastructure. Exports and re-exports of these items require an individual validated license from the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security.

The United States continues to engage Syrians directly, offering academic advising to young people hoping to study in the United States and opportunities to participate in academic exchanges and other outreach programs. The State Department is also working with a range of Syrian, American, and international partners to protect Syria's rich cultural heritage – including archaeological sites, historic buildings, monuments, and collections of objects – and to halt the trade of looted Syrian cultural property in international antiquities markets.

The State Department maintains an active dialogue to coordinate policy and assistance for Syria with a broad cross-section of Syrian opposition groups, including with the Syrian Coalition offices in Egypt, Turkey, and Washington. We are also in close contact with many Americans, including Syrian-Americans, who have contributed generously and organized to provide assistance to Syrians in need.

PRN: 2013/0768

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210899.htm>



